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Judicial Deference to
Administrative Interpretation of
Statutes from a Comparative
Perspective
Vincent Martenet*
ABSTRACT

This Article examines, from a comparative perspective, how
judicial deference to administrative interpretation of statutes takes
place and whether it is constitutionallyadmissible. Since constitutions
and statutes rarely deal expressly with this issue, courts may have to
determine whether or not such deference is permitted, and, if so,

whether generally or in certain cases only. The constitutional, legal,
and judicial context prevailing in each country is particularly
important in this regard. Nevertheless, it may provide courts with little,

if any, guidance on the specific issue of deference to administrative
statutory interpretation.In this respect, a nuanced approachalong all
or part of the following lines may be appropriate: When (i) in light of

the applicable methods and canons of construction, a statute allows a
margin of interpretation, (ii) the administrative interpretationof the
statute remains within this margin, and (iii) the applicable
international, constitutional, statutory or other constraints permit or,
at least, do not exclude judicial deference eithergenerally or in the case
at hand, then courts may or, depending on the country, must defer to
the administrative interpretation of the statute, especially when or,
dependingon the country, provided that (iv) this interpretationrequires
non-legal expertise, (v) the administrativebody enjoys an asymmetry of
such expertise as compared to courts, and (vi) the legislature was or
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should have been aware of both this necessity and this asymmetry. The
level of courts' expertise in the relevant subject-matter should, in
principle, be determined after taking account of the measures available
to judges, including the appointment of experts. The proposed test may
notably be followed where the disputed interpretation requires a
prediction, appraisalor assessment.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Different decision-making bodies make administrative decisions.
Agencies with some-substantial or limited-independence from
government exist, for instance, in several democratic countries. Those
agencies' officials and staff are usually specialists with profound

knowledge of the field for which they are responsible. One of their tasks
consists of interpreting and applying the statutes that they administer.
Agencies belong to the executive branch of the government and form
functionally separate units within this branch. They may be numerous
in some countries, like France, 1 and few in others, such as in

Germany. 2
This Article deals with administrative decisions, that is, decisions
taken by administrative bodies or decision-makers, in particular by
agencies. Several ideas in this Article may actually apply to the
executive branch in its entirety, including to the head of state or
government. Nonetheless, courts and scholars have specifically dealt
with the interpretation of statutes by agencies or other administrative
bodies and subsequent review of this interpretation by courts. The bulk
of judicial decisions and scholarly publications are of great interest,
particularly from a comparative perspective. Administrative decisions,

with some exceptions, can be appealed to courts. Most judges hear
cases on a wide range of issues and, accordingly, may be considered as
generalists. However, legal interpretation is one of their core
competencies-if not their main competency. 3 While reviewing a case,

See infra Part IV.A.3.
1.
See, e.g., Georg Hermes, Abhdngige und unabhangige Verwaltungsbehorden:
2.
Ein berblick fiber die Bundesverwaltung [Dependent and Independent Administrative
Authorities: An Overview of the Federal Administration], in UNABHANGIGE
REGULIERUNGSBEHORDEN

[INDEPENDENT

REGULATION

AUTHORITIES]

53,

85-86

(Johannes Masing & Gerard Marcou eds., 2010). The German Federal Constitutional
Court considers that "the establishment of independent agencies does not ... meet with
any fundamental objections, but remains precarious from the democratic imperative's

perspective." Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFG] [Federal Constitutional Court] July
30, 2019, 151 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS

[BVERFGE] 202,

295 (Ger.).
For views from federal appellate judges themselves in the United States, see
3.
Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretationon the Bench: A Survey of
Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1348-50

86

6VANDERBILT/OURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[voL. 54:83

judges may have to assess the administrative interpretation of a
statute. Broadly speaking, the judiciary examines a decision of the
executive based on an act emanating from the legislature. The
separation of powers principle and the concept of checks and balances
form the backdrop of this subject.
Judicial review of administrative decisions often raises the
question of deference from courts. There can be many instances of
judicial deference in a single country, 4 which overlap to a certain or
greater extent. s The distinction between these various types of
deference is the subject of scholarly critique in certain jurisdictions.
Some scholars plead for a clearer, more unified understanding of the
notions of administrative discretion and judicial deference. 6 This
Article's aim is not to elaborate a typology in this regard. Suffice it to

say, even after simplifying the approach for considering administrative
discretion and judicial deference, these scholars usually acknowledge
that the latter would still relate to statutory interpretation, 7 among
other elements.

(2018) ("[M]ost of the judges we interviewed do not favor the Chevron rule [judicial
deference to agency statutory interpretation when certain conditions are met]. Here is
where we see a 'D.C. Circuit effect' in our study. All but one of the D.C. Circuit judges
we interviewed-who were of different generations and political parties-were admirers
of Chevron deference, whereas most other judges from the other courts of appeals were
decidedly anti-Chevron.").
4.
Regarding Germany, see, for example, Jan S. Oster, The Scope of Judicial
Review in the German and U.S. Administrative Legal System, 9 GER. L.J. 1267, 1269-75
(2008); Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, Eigenstindigkeit der Verwaltung [Autonomy of the
Administration], in 1 GRUNDLAGEN DES VERWALTUNGSRECHTS [FOUNDATIONS oF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw] 677, 727-28 (Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, Eberhard SchmidtABmann & Andreas VossBkuhle eds., 2nd ed. 2012). Regarding the United States, see,
for example, John C. Reitz, Deference to the Administration in JudicialReview, 66 AM.
J. COMP. L. 269, 272 (2018).
5.
Regarding Germany, see, for example, JAN OSTER, NORMATIVE
ERMACHTIGUNGEN

IM

REGULIERUNGSRECHT

[NORMATIVE

AUTHORIZATIONS

IN

&

REGULATION] 60-68 (2010).
6.
Regarding Germany, see, for example, Matthias Jestaedt, Ma,6stabe des
Verwaltungshandels [Standards in Administrative Action], in ALLGEMEINES
VERWALTUNGSRECHT [GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAw] 325, 334-41 (Dirk Ehlers
Hermann Punder eds., 15th ed. 2016); Guy Beaucamp, Ermessens und
Beurteilungsfehler im Vergleich [Errors of Assessment and Judgment from a
Comparative PerspectiveJ, 2012 JURISTISCHE ARBEITSBLATI'ER [LEGAL WORKSHEETS]
193, 194. For an assessment of this view, see OSTER, supra note 5, at 60-68. Regarding
Switzerland, see, for example, BENJAMIN SCHINDLER, VERWALTUNGSERMESSEN
[ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION] 328-29, 339, 383, 407-08 (2010); THIERRY TANQUEREL,
MANUEL DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF [ADMINISTRATIVE LAW HANDBOOK] 177-79 (2d ed.

2018).
7.
Regarding Germany, see, for example, Jestaedt, supra note 6, at 335-37;
Beaucamp, supra note 6, at 195. Regarding Switzerland, see, for example, SCHINDLER,
supra note 6, at 407-09; TANQUEREL, supra note 6, at 178-79; Le contr6le de
l'opportunitd [Control of Opportunity], in LE CONTENTIEUX ADMINISTRATIF
[ADMINISTRATIVE DISPUTE] 209, 219-23 (Frangois Bellanger & Thierry Tanquerel eds.,

2013).
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This Article is devoted to judicial deference on questions of legal
interpretation, which must be answered by applying relevant
principles to the interpretation of the law. A distinction has been made
between law-based deference-founded on the statutory delegation, to
administrative bodies, of powers to promulgate rules and regulations
with the force of law and to adjudicate disputes in specific areas with

the force of law-and fact-based deference-grounded in the courts'
appreciation of the expertise and experience of the administrative
body. 8 In many cases, however, both reasons for judicial deference tend

to blend and may actually operate together. 9 This Article actually
combines them without blurring the line between them. It is predicated
on the idea that a legislature may explicitly or implicitly enable or even
require courts to exercise deference with respect to the administrative

interpretation

of

statutes,

notably

because

of

the

relevant

administrative bodies' expertise and experience. Therefore, this Article
links a normative dimension of deference-the allocation of
interpretive authority-to a factual one-the asymmetry of non-legal
expertise between agencies or other administrative bodies and courts.
Specifically, this Article deals with judicial deference in cases
involving the interpretation of statutes. The issue is quite
straightforward when such a limit to the judges' power is expressly
foreseen by the constitution or the applicable laws, bearing in mind
that the constitutionality of a law may still be challenged. However,
such deference, if and when it arises, is usually not based on a specific
constitutional provision or statute. Rather, it results from broader
considerations related to inter-branch relations.
This Article focuses on the relationship between administrative
bodies and courts when the interpretation of an ambiguous or unclear
statute is disputed as opposed to when administrative policy

determinations are challenged, except when these raise issues relating
to the interpretation of statutes.1 0 Judicial deference to administrative
interpretation of statutes is possible not only in Canada and in the
United States, but also in other countries."l Questions relating to the
relationship between administrative bodies and courts in statutory
interpretation cases arise in several democratic countries, regardless

8.
9.

Regarding the United States, see Reitz, supra note 4, at 272.
Regarding
Germany,
see,
for
example,
Martin

Eifert,

Letztentscheidungsbefugnisse der Verwaltung: Ermessen, Beurteilungsspielrdume sowie

Planungsentscheidungen und ihre gerichtliche Kontrolle [Ultimate Decision-Making
Powers of the Administration:Discretion, Latitudes of Judgement, PlanningDecisions,
and their Judicial Control], 2008 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DAS JURIsTISCHE STUDIUM [J. FOR
LEGAL STUD.] 336, 339-40.
On this distinction, see infra Parts II, III.A.
10.
11.
Regarding Germany and Switzerland, for instance, see infra Parts III.A,
VI.C.2.
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of their legal traditions.' 2 They invite us to reflect from a comparative
perspective, without ignoring the constitutional, legal, and judicial
context prevailing in each country, and being fully aware that
generalizations regarding judicial deference should be, if not
completely avoided, at least very carefully crafted. A nuanced approach
is actually inevitable.
This Article, which includes seven parts, presents a few thoughts
on judicial deference to administrative interpretation of statutes,
based on a comparative review. Following the introduction (Part I),

Part II justifies the choice of the countries considered and explains the
purpose of this comparative study. Part III sets out relevant
preconditions for deference in cases involving the interpretation of
statutes. Parts IV and V respectively make the case for and against
judicial deference to administrative interpretation of statutes. Based
on this, Part VI evaluates possible limits and criteria for such
deference. In the Article's conclusion (Part VII), deference is described
as oil in the complex machinery of checks and balances.

II.

COUNTRIES CONSIDERED AND PURPOSE OF THE COMPARISON

Twenty-seven countries and a special administrative region have
been considered in this Article.' 3 In addition, the European Union and
the Council of Europe have also been included, as the case law,
respectively, of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the
European Court of Human Rights is relevant in this field. This
comparative study is the broadest one among academic articles' 4 on
the specific issue of judicial deference to administrative interpretation
of statutes.'5 Although books have been published in this field, some

12.
See infra Part III.
13.
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong (Special Administrative Region of the
People's Republic of China), India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Poland, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea (the Republic of Korea), Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan (Republic of China), the United Kingdom, and the United
States. China is also briefly mentioned in this Article.
14.
See generallyPaul Craig, JudicialReview of Questions of Law: A Comparative
Perspective, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 389 (Susan Rose-Ackerman, Peter L.
Lindseth, & Blake Emerson eds., 2d ed. 2017) (examining aspects of legal systems of
Canada, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States); Paul Daly,
Deference on Questions of Law, 74 MOD. L. REV. 694 (2011) [hereinafter Daly, Deference
on Questions of Law] (examining aspects of the legal systems of Canada, the United
Kingdom, and the United States); Oster, supra note 4 (examining aspects of the legal
systems of Germany and the United States).
Unclear issues have been verified by specialists of the relevant countries, who
15.
are acknowledged in the first footnote.
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are limited in geographical scope, while others have a broader focus
16
and do not look specifically at legal interpretation.

While the choice of countries is also based on the availability of
data, it should primarily allow for coverage of most of the countries

where adherence to the rule of law may be qualified as strong." Since
the topic of this Article relates to legal interpretation and to the

relationship among the legislative, executive, and judiciary branches,
it is rooted in the rule of law and judicial independence. When the rule
of law and judicial independence are not sufficiently guaranteed, it is
difficult to conduct a principled analysis of judicial deference to
administrative interpretation of statutes. The choice of countries also
allows for diversity in terms of legal systems and geography in order to
avoid either a European- or a North American-centric view.
This Article firstly aims to identify preconditions for deference in
cases involving interpretation of statutes. The comparative perspective

is useful, as it helps to assess whether the issue of judicial deference to
administrative interpretation of statutes is closely linked to a
particular system. As this Article will demonstrate, the relevant
preconditions are quite general and may be met in many countries,

16.

See generally DEFERENCE TO THE ADMINISTRATION IN JUDICIAL REVIEW:

COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Guobin Zhu ed., 2019) (most of the chapters in this book
do not, however, focus on judicial deference to administrative interpretation of statutes);
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE

STATE

(Jurgen de Poorter, Ernst Hirsch Ballin, & Saskia Lavrijssen eds., 2019) (examining
aspects of legal systems of the European Union, the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom); MATTHEW LEWANS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND JUDICIAL DEFERENCE (2018)

(examining aspects of the legal systems of Canada, Israel, New Zealand, South Africa,
the United Kingdom, and the United States); EDUARDO JORDAO, LE JUGE ET
L'ADMINISTRATION: ENTRE LE CONTROLE ET LA DtFERENCE [THE JUDGE AND THE
ADMINISTRATION: BETWEEN CONTROL AND DEFERENCE] (2016) (examining aspects of the

legal systems of Canada, France, Italy and the United States); PAUL DALY, A THEORY OF
DEFERENCE IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: BASIS, APPLICATION AND SCOPE (2012) (examining

aspects of the legal systems of Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the
United States); Oster, supra note 4 (examining aspects of the legal systems of Germany
and the United States).
17. The Article covers 18 of the first 20 countries listed in the ranking "Rule of
Law Around the World" published by the World Justice Project. For the 2020 Index, see
WORLD
JUSTICE
PROJECT,
RULE
OF
LAW
INDEX
2020
5
(2020),
https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJP-ROLI-2020Online_O.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KB8-5NJ7] (archived Sept. 26, 2020) (presenting itself
as "the world's most comprehensive dataset of its kind and the only to rely principally
on primary data"). Norway and Estonia were not purposely left out in this Article, but
reliable data regarding the topic of this Article could not be found for them. European
countries are already well represented in our analysis. Approximately two thirds of the
countries belonging to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) and all of the major jurisdictions among them are covered in this Article. The
OECD is deemed to "form a community of nations committed to the values of democracy
based on rule of law and human rights".

See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-

OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), OECD 50Th ANNIVERSARY VISION STATEMENT 2
[https://perma.cc/HWQ9-JXD3]
https://www.oecd.org/mcm/48064973.pdf
(2011),
(archived Sept. 26, 2020).
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which means that this question can arise-and does actually arise-in
different legal systems.
Since judicial deference to administrative interpretation of
statutes depends on rather loose preconditions, this Article secondly
analyzes the arguments made in favor of or against such deference in
several countries. Here also, the comparative perspective is interesting
and even fascinating as similar arguments exist in most, if not all, of

the countries examined, but are weighed differently. 18 These
similarities may lead to a nuanced approach with respect to judicial
deference to administrative interpretation of statutes.
This Article tries to use the collected data to define, from a
comparative perspective, limits and criteria for judicial deference to
administrative interpretation of statutes. Depending on the country,
the room for deference may be broader, narrower, or nonexistent.
Common ground between different countries may be brought to light

through a comparative study and may indicate where the case for
judicial

deference

to

administrative

statutory

interpretation

is

strongest. Judges in some countries may find comparative support for
the doctrine they have developed, but, at the same time, may take into
consideration arguments to limit the doctrine. Judges in other
countries may see reasons to reconsider their position against any

judicial deference in statutory interpretation cases.
Given the significant cross-national variation in administrative
law systems, this Article is framed with an awareness of national
differences but is not hindered by this. Many important factors that
might come into play have been considered in order to come up with a
way of thinking about deference which could intelligibly apply to
different countries. Nevertheless, various features in administrative

law systems may significantly affect debates about deference. The
difference between review in specialized administrative courts or
tribunals versus general jurisdiction courts may influence approaches
to deference.1 9 The possibilities for a court to appoint experts may also
play a role in this respect. This Article takes these issues into account,
as it puts at its center the asymmetry of non-legal expertise between

administrative bodies and courts.2 0 Depending on many factors, this
asymmetry may be minimal or important. The processes by which

For a comparative perspective, see, for example, Guobin Zhu, Deference to the
18.
Administration in Judicial Review: Comparative Perspectives, in DEFERENCE TO THE
ADMINISTRATION IN JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 16, at 1, 10-11.
19. But see Despoina Mantzari, Judicial Scrutiny of Regulatory Decisions at the
UK's Specialist Competition Appeal Tribunal, in JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE
DISCRETION IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE, supra note 16, 63, 80 ("Even specialist

tribunals are limited in their ability to decide on regulatory remedies, which involve the
representation of diverse interests, the balancing of a variety of goals, and prospective
analysis.").
20.
See infra Parts IV.A.1, VI.B.

20211
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statutes are drafted and the way-precise or vague, for instance-in
which they are written, may also affect the salience of the issue. The

breadth of delegation to agencies or other administrative bodies of
powers to adjudicate disputes in specific areas with the force of law
may considerably vary from one country to another.
Furthermore, this Article insists on the margin of interpretation
that a statute must allow in order for the issue of deference to
22
potentially appear. 21 It also emphasizes the role of the legislature,

which may vary from one country to another or from one piece of
legislation to another in the same country. In other words, this Article
is based on a nuanced approach and gives attention to how systemic or

structural differences between countries or within a given country
might bear on deference issues.

Finally, without any claim to

completeness, the way proceedings and deliberations are conducted by
agencies or other administrative bodies-court-like or more
government-like, for instance-as well as the parties' degree of
involvement and procedural rights in those proceedings-with
23
disparities or similarities between countries -may impact the debate
on judicial deference. The importance of procedural safeguards, with
24
respect to the issues covered, is given prominence in this Article.

III.

PRECONDITIONS FOR DEFERENCE IN CASES INVOLVING THE
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

Judicial deference to administrative interpretation of statutes
may arise where three main preconditions are met. Firstly, the statute
in question allows a margin of interpretation with respect to the
specific issue raised (subpart A). Secondly, the court's deference must
fit within international, constitutional, as well as statutory or other
constraints (subpart B) and, thirdly, the court's deference must

somehow be willed or accepted by the legislature (subpart C).

See infra Parts III.A, VI.C.2.
21.
See infra Parts IIIC, VIC.
22.
Regarding the United States and Germany, see Hermann Punder, German
23.
Administrative Procedure in a Comparative Perspective: Observations on the Path to a
TransnationalIus Commune Proceduralis in Administrative Law, 11 INT'L J. CoNST. L.
[t]he procedural requirements
940, 950 (2013) ("[L]ooking at 'formal adjudications,' ...
in the two jurisdictions are quite alike. The conflict between the demand for democratic
decision-making under the rule of law and administrative efficiency is resolved in a
similar way in both countries.").
See infra Parts III.B, V.D, VIA.
24.
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Interpretationof Statutes and Margin of Interpretation

In the context of this Article, the interpretation of statutes refers,
broadly speaking, to the process of determining the meaning of

statutory provisions. An agency or another administrative body that
administers a statute, and the court that reviews the decisions based

on the statute, must carry out this process. This issue becomes
especially interesting when the relevant statutory provision is
ambiguous or unclear. This Article does not deal primarily with judicial
control over administrative decisions when a statute, in itself clear,
allows an administrative body to choose among several possibilities
and grants it a margin of discretion or appreciation in this regard.25 In
such a case, questions relating to the interpretation of the statute may
arise, but they are typically not at the core of the litigation in judicial
proceedings, which will focus in many countries, for instance, on the
principle of proportionality.2 6 This Article covers this issue when the
provision granting administrative discretion, for example regarding
the possibility to choose between several measures, is itself ambiguous.
In such a case, the statute's interpretation becomes crucial when the
administrative body and then the court determine the scope of
discretion that the first enjoys and that the second must respect.
The debate on judicial deference to administrative interpretation
of statutes essentially arises where an unclear or ambiguous statute
must initially be interpreted by an administrative body and then by a
court. In the United States, the statute must be "silent or ambiguous

with respect to the specific issue," according to the landmark Chevron
decision of the Supreme Court.2 7 In Canada, the Supreme Court
follows a similar approach, at least in some cases:
because legislatures do not always speak clearly and because the tools of
statutory interpretation do not always guarantee a single clear answer,
legislative provisions will on occasion be susceptible to multiple reasonable
interpretations.... [T]he resolution of unclear language in an administrative

25.
On the distinction between margin of appreciation and margin of discretion,
see Rob Widdershoven, The European Court of Justice and the Standard of Judicial
Review, in JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE

STATE, supra note 16, at 39, 53 (noting that, "in the case law of the [European Court of
Justice,] such distinction is generally not made and both terms are used
interchangeably").
26.
On proportionality as a "master concept of public law," even though there is
no explicit "proportionality review" in American administrative law, see Jud Mathews,
ProportionalityReview in Administrative Law, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,
supra note 14, at 405-06. Regarding the United States specifically, see generally Jud
Mathews, Agency Discretion, JudicialReview and 'Proportionality'inUS Administrative
Law, in THE JUDGE AND THE PROPORTIONATE USE OF DISCRETION: A COMPARATIVE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STUDY 160 (Sofia Ranchordis & Boudewijn de Waard eds., 2015).
27.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984).
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decision maker's home statute is usually best left to the decision maker. That is
so because the choice between multiple reasonable interpretations will often
involve policy considerations that we presume the legislature desired the
administrativedecision maker-not the courts-to make. Indeed, the exercise of
that interpretative discretion is part of an administrative decision maker's
"expertise." ... It will not always be the case that a particular provision permits
multiple reasonable interpretations. Where the ordinary tools of statutory
interpretation lead to a single reasonable interpretation and the administrative
decision maker adopts a different interpretation, its interpretation will
necessarily be unreasonable-no degree of deference can justify its
will
acceptance.... In those cases, the "range of reasonable outcomes" ...
necessarily be limited to a single reasonable interpretation-and the
25
administrative decision maker must adopt it.

In Germany or Switzerland, for instance, the statute must contain
an "indefinite legal term," 2 though this is only a precondition for
eventual judicial deference. 30 In Austria, the federal Constitution
provides that
[e]xcept in administrative penal proceedings and in legal matters pertaining to
the competence of the Administrative Court of the Federation for Finance,
illegality does not exist to the extent the law permits the administrative
authority to apply discretion and the authority has done so in the sense of the
law.

31

It is now considered that this provision does not prevent the
adoption of federal statutes that grant the administration or specific
be subsequently respected by
some discretion-to
agencies
administrative courts-in the interpretation of indefinite legal terms

in complex technical or economic matters. 32 One should finally note
that said courts can decide cases on the merits.

McLean v. Exec. Dir. of the British Columbia Sec. Comm'n, [2013] 3 S.C.R.
28.
895, paras. 32-33, 38 (Can.) (citations omitted). For a critical view on this approach, see
Paul Daly, UnreasonableInterpretationsof Law, 66 SUP. CT. L. REV. (2D) 233, 248-50
(2014) [hereinafter Daly, UnreasonableInterpretationsof Law].
Regarding Germany, see, for example, Oster, supra note 4, at 1271-73;
29.
Hoffmann-Riem, supra note 4, at 744-46. Regarding Switzerland, see, for example,
PIERRE MOOR, ALEXANDRE FLUCKIGER & VINCENT MARTENET, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF
[ADMINISTRATIVE LAW] 749-54 (3d ed. 2012).
Regarding Germany, see, for example, Manfred Aschke, § 40, in BECK'SCHER
30.
ONLINE-KOMMENTAR VWVFG [BECK ONLINE COMMENTARY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE

PROCEDURE ACT] ¶¶ 102-03 (Johann Bader & Michael Ronellenfitsch eds., 50th ed.
2021); ROLF WANK, DIE AUSLEGUNG VON GESETZEN [THE INTERPRETATION OF LAWS] 5253 (6th ed. 2015); Eifert, supra note 9, at 339.
31.

art. 130,

BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ

¶ 3,

(Austria)

(reinstated

[B-VG]

in

1945,

[CONSTITUTION]

with

BGBL No.

subsequent

1/1930,

amendments)

translated in https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Austria_2013.pdflang-en)

(last visited Sept. 25, 2020) [https://perma.cc/FVK5-4G6L] (archived Sept. 25, 2020).
See, e.g., Michael Mayrhofer, Administrative Spielrdume und die Rolle der
32.
Heilmittel- Evaluierungs-Kommission bei der Aufnahme eines Arzneimittels in den
Erstattungskodex [Administrative Scope and Role of the Pharmaceutical Evaluation
Commission in Including a Drug in the Reimbursement Codef, 2016 JOURNAL FUR
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In the Czech Republic, ambiguous statutory terms might have led
to some deference from courts in the past, but the tendency goes
towards full judicial review of the interpretation of such terms. 33 In

Denmark, courts normally do not defer to the administrative
interpretation of a statute, but they may sometimes be more reluctant
to conduct an in-depth review of the interpretation chosen by an agency
when a provision of statute is formulated very broadly. 34 In Japan,
courts often admit that administrative bodies may hold a primary
decision-making power and that courts may only review the
reasonableness of these decisions. as It is, however, neither
theoretically nor empirically established whether the interpretation of
statutes by administrative bodies is also embodied in this attitude.
Indeed, agency discretion may arise from indefinite concepts, 36 but
judicial deference relates especially to fact-finding, the application of a
statutory concept in a specific factual context, or some procedural
decisions, s7 but not so much to the interpretation of a statute.
Japanese courts have never officially adopted a Chevron-type
deference. In Poland, some administrative discretion may result from

the interpretation of vague statutory terms,3 8 but a doctrine of judicial
deference to administrative interpretation of statutes has not yet been
developed by Polish courts.3 9
In sum, the provision(s) of a statute at issue can reasonably be
interpreted in various ways.4 0 Of course, the difference between clarity
and ambiguity is equivocal and is itself a question of interpretation. 4 1

MEDIZIN UND GESUNDHEITSRECHT [J. MED. & HEALTH L.] 54, 57 (Austria); Stefan Storr,

PriifungsmaJstab der Verwaltungsgerichte [Administrative Tribunals' Standards of
ReviewJ, 2013 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR VERKHERSRECHT [J. TRAFFIC L.] 248, 441 (Ger.).
33.
See Nejvyssi sprivni soud Oeske republiky 22.4.2014 (NSS) [Decision of the
Supreme Administrative Court of Apr. 22, 2014], cj. 8 Azs 37/2011-154, ¶ 24 (Czech). See
also Zdenek Kuhn & Josef Staia, Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review in
the Czech Republic, in DEFERENCE TO THE ADMINISTRATION IN JUDICIAL REvIEW, supra
note 16, at 133, 139-40.
34.
See Bent Ole, Gram Mortensen & Frederik Waage, Deference to the
Administration in JudicialReview in Denmark, in DEFERENCE TO THE ADMINISTRATION
IN JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 16, at 157, 161.

35.

See Norikazu Kawagishi, Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review

in Japan, in DEFERENCE TO THE ADMINISTRATION IN JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 16, at

295, 299-305.
See id. at 301-02.
36.
See id. at 304-05.
37.
See Zbigniew Kmieciak & Joanna Wegner, Deference to the Public
38.
Administration in Judicial Review: A Polish Perspective, in DEFERENCE TO THE
ADMINISTRATION IN JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 16, at 363, 375-76.
See id. at 373-77.
39.
40.
On this issue, see, for example. Jeffrey Barnes, Statutory Interpretation and
Administrative Law, in MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN AUSTRALIA: CONCEPTS AND

CONTEXT 119, 133-39 (Matthew Groves ed., 2014).
41.

See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISM OF DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL

DESIGN WRIT SMALL 150 (2007).
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The presence of ambiguity, vagueness, or broadness may lead to at
least two admissible or defensible interpretations of a statute in light

of the applicable methods and canons of construction used by courts
42
and, as the case may be, administrative bodies. In brief, the statute
43
allows a margin of interpretation or construction.
It is, however, argued that "[a]mbiguity should not be allowed to

become the gateway to deference" and that "[t]he proper gateway is the
delegation of interpretive authority." 44 Are these two approaches really
in opposition? The principles of statutory interpretation may indeed
assist "in determining the extent of the authority delegated [or, better,
granted] to the administrative decision-maker." 46 Typically, in
countries where judicial deference in statutory interpretation cases is
accepted, statutes often do not explicitly grant agencies or other
46
administrative bodies an interpretive authority. The grant-if anyof some or all of this authority may inter aliaresult from the ambiguity,
unclearness, vagueness, broadness, or indefiniteness of legal terms.

Consequently, the "modest role for the principles of statutory
circumscribing
than
rather
identifying
in
interpretation
administrative autonomy" 47 determines whether a statute is
ambiguous, unclear or vague, or contains an indefinite legal term. This
does not mean that the principles of statutory interpretation are
"designed to identify ambiguity"; they are indeed "designed to resolve
it." 48 But the best answer to a legal question and to the allocation of
interpretive authority may sometimes have to go through a
preliminary assessment of ambiguity, unclearness, vagueness, or
indefiniteness.

On this issue, see, for example, Daly, Deference on Questions of Law, supra
42.
note 14, at 699-700. Regarding Germany, see, for example, Eifert, supra note 9, at 33839.
A distinction between "interpretation" and "construction" is not made here in
43.
this context, but scholars in the United States recently based their reflections on this
distinction. The first concept is supposed to call "for discerning the meaning of a statute,"
and the second one "for determining the legal effect of the statute, through
implementation rules, specification, and other devices." See generally Lawrence B. Solum
& Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron as Construction, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1465, 1468 (2020).
In this Article, "interpretation" is used in a broad sense that encompasses the
"construction" of open-textured words such as "harm." On the notion of "constructional

choice," regarding Australia, see Janina Boughey, The Case for "Deference" to (Some)
Executive Interpretationsof Law, in INTERPRETING EXEcUTIVE POWER 34, 36, 53 (Janina

Boughey & Lisa Burton Crawford eds., 2020).
Daly, UnreasonableInterpretationsof Law, supra note 28, at 268.
44.
Id. at 267.
45.
On this issue, see id. at 267 ("A reviewing court's approach must be holistic:
46.
it should not focus on one clause or one statutory provision in isolation, but must strive
to understand the regulatory framework created by the whole of the statute." (footnote
omitted)).
Id. at 269-70.
47.
Id. at 254.
48.
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The point that deference should not become the gateway to further
deference is nevertheless taken, as courts should not assess ambiguity
or unclearness in itself, but the existence of a margin of interpretation
in light of the applicable methods and canons of construction. This

approach is more flexible and gradual4 9 than the one-too schematic
and binary-that consists of determining whether or not a statute is

ambiguous. 50 Judges are not supposed to either unnecessarily define
the exact extent of the margin, or list all the admissible or reasonable
interpretations of the statute provision at hand.51 Moreover, by finding
the existence of a margin of interpretation, they do not have to indicate
their preference for a different interpretation of the statute than the
one chosen by the administrative body; they simply accept the latter
because it remains within said margin.5 2

B.

International, Constitutional, Statutory, and Other Constraints

Deference presents itself within a constitutional and statutory.
framework. Ceterisparibus, the more constraining the latter, the less
relevant the debate on judicial deference in statutory interpretation
cases becomes. International constraints may also come into play, most
notably regarding the right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 14 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6 of
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),53 Article 8 of the
American Convention on Human Rights, or Article 7 of the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.5 4 General principles such as
the rule of law may impose other constraints.

49.
On this question, focusing on Canada, see RUTH SULLIvAN, SULLIVAN ON THE
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 25 (6th ed. 2014) ('Texts are not either plain or ambiguous;
rather they are more or less plain and more or less ambiguous. The factors that justify
outcomes in statutory interpretation are multiple, involving inferences about meaning
and intention derived from the text, non-textual evidence of legislative intent,
specialized knowledge, 'common sense' and legal norms. These factors interact in
complex ways."). Regarding the United States, see Nicholas R. Bednar & Kristin E.
Hickman, Chevron's Inevitability, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1392, 1446 (2017).
50.
On this issue, see, for example, JORDAO, supra note 16, at 233-35, 248-49.
51.
Regarding Canada, see a recent decision of the Supreme Court, Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, [2019] S.C.C. 65, para. 83 ("[A]
court applying the reasonableness standard does not ask what decision it would have
made in place of that of the administrative decision maker, attempt to ascertain the
'range' of possible conclusions that would have been open to the decision maker, conduct
a de novo analysis or seek to determine the 'correct' solution to the problem.").
52.
On this issue, see VERMEULE, supranote 41, at 156-65. Regarding the United
States, see Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140
S. Ct. 2367, 2400 (2020) (Kagan, J., concurring in the judgment) ("If I had to, I would of
course decide which is the marginally better reading [of the statute]. But Chevron
deference was built for cases like these.").
53.
European Convention on Human Rights art. 6, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. 5.
54. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 7, June 27, 1981, 1520
U.N.T.S. 26363.
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Two types of constitutional constraints limit the possibility of
judicial deference in statutory interpretation cases. Firstly, the role of
the judiciary is defined in general terms in many constitutions. The
relevant constitutional provisions may prevent any general or broad

deference

from the courts reviewing

administrative decisions. 55

Secondly, constitutional procedural safeguards may guarantee the

right to appeal these decisions to a court which can fully review the
merits of each case by assessing all relevant facts in addition to the
56
correct interpretation of the law and its application to the facts. In
the United States, deference doctrines-Chevron in particular-are
under fire by various scholars, and deference claims are met with
increased skepticism in courts; notably, the argument is made that due
process rights come into play and restrict a court's ability to defer to
agency interpretationof statutes.b7
Statutory constraints can typically require courts to fully assess
the merits of a case and prevent them from using any type of deference
58
to administrative interpretation of statutes. In the United States, a
2018 bill adopted in the state of Arizona forbids all judicial deference
in constitutional interpretation or interpretation of statutes regarding
most of the state's own agencies:
[i] n a proceeding brought by or against the regulated party, the court shall decide
all questions of law, including the interpretation of a constitutional or statutory
provision or a rule adopted by an agency, without deference to any previous
59
determination that may have been made on the question by the agency.

C.

The Legislature's Intent or Assent

Judicial deference to administrative interpretation of statutes
seems to relate to the relationship between the judiciary and the

executive branches. However, the legislature is also a key player

See infra Parts V.C, VIA.
55.
See infra Parts V.D, VIA.
56.
See, e.g., Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1187
57.
(2016). But see Gillian E. Metzger, The Roberts Court and Administrative Law, 2019 SUP.
CT. REv. 1, 4 (2020) ("[F]or all of its alarmism about bureaucrats running amok and
assertions that the contemporary administrative state violates the constitutional order,
the Roberts Court hadn't yet pulled back significantly on administrative governance in
practice.").
58.
Regarding the United States, see, for example, The Chevron Doctrine:
Constitutional and Statutory Questions in Judicial Deference to Agencies: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial & Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 28 (2016) (statement of Jonathan Turley, Shapiro Professor
of Public Interest Law, George Washington University) [hereinafter Statement of
Jonathan Turley] ("Because the [Chevron] doctrine is based on assumption of delegated
authority, Congress can aggressively move to limit such deference....").
59.
H.B. 2238, 53rd Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., § 12-910(E) (Ariz. 2018).
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here.60 It may widely forbid any judicial deference, as the state of
Arizona recently did, or, on the contrary, expressly authorize it.
Express authorization is seldom granted and must in any case
comply with applicable international, constitutional, statutory and
other constraints. The second sentence of Section 71(5) of the German
Act against Restraints of Competition is an interesting example in this

regard, as it states that "[t]he evaluation of the general economic
situation and trends by the competition authority shall not be subject
to review by the court."6 1

In the vast majority of cases, statutes do not explicitly address the
issue of judicial deference but do not expressly preclude it either.62
Scholars and courts 63 in some countries have developed various
theories according to which the legislature is supposed to have
accepted judicial deference and this particular setting of the separation
of powers principle or of the concept of checks and balances.
In the United States, the Chevron doctrine especially supposes
that Congress has delegated or granted agencies the authority to act
with the force of law. 64 In Germany, it is based on the so-called
"normative authorization doctrine" (normative Ermachtigungslehre).65

From a comparative perspective, see Peter Lindseth, Judicial Review in
60.
Administrative Governance: A Theoretical Framework for Comparative Analysis, in
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION, supra note 16, at 175, 188. See also,
with a special focus on Canada, DALY, supra note 16, at 36-69 (concluding, on page 69,

that "a holistic approach, which requires a proper consideration of the relevant statutory
provisions, is necessary to ascertain the extent of the delegation of power"). Regarding
Germany, see, for example, Oster, supra note 4, at 1273-75; Eberhard Schmidt-ABmann,
Artikel 19 Abs. 4 [Article 19 Sect. 4], in GRUNDGE$ETZ: KOMMENTAR [BASIC LAW:
COMMENTARY] ¶¶ 184-86 (Theodor Maunz & Gunter Durig eds, 2020). Regarding the
United States, see, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron As Law, 107 GEO. L.J. 1613,
1634-35 (2019) ("The initial question, and perhaps the only question, is: What has
Congress required?").
61.
Gesetz Gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen [GWB] [Act Against Restraints
of Competition], June 26, 2013, BUNDE$GE5ETZBLATT [BGBL I] § 71(5) (Ger.), translated
(last visited Sept. 23, 2020)
at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englischgwb/
see
also
(archived
Sept.
20,
2020);
[https://perma.cc/QJW2-8R7T]
Telekommunikationsgesetz [TKG] [German Telecommunications Act], July 25, 1996,
translated
in
I]
§
10(2)
(Ger.),
BUNDESGESETZBLATT
[BGBL
23,
2020)
(last
visited
Sept.
https://germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org/?p=692
[https://perma.cc/99JX-LR4H] (archived Sept. 23, 2020).
Regarding Germany and the U.S., see Oster, supra note 4, at 1284; KLAAs
62.
VON
UBERPRUFUNG
DER
GERICHTLICHEN
KONTROLLDICHTE
BoSCH,
DIE
NACH
DEM
DER
BUNDESNETZAGENTUR
MARKTREGULIERUNGSENTSCHEIDUNGEN
TELEKOMMUNIKATIONSGESETZ [THE DENSITY OF CONTROL OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
MARKET REGULATION DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL NETWORK AGENCY ACCORDING TO THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT] 46-50 (2010); Hoffmann-Riem, supra note 4, at 746.

63.
From a comparative perspective, see Zhu, supra note 18, at 7 ("Deference is a
legal concept developed by judge made law." (emphasis in original)).
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
64.
65.
See, e.g., Aschke, supra note 30, ¶ 103; Hoffmann-Riem, supra note 4, at 736,
supra note 60, ¶¶ 185-87a; Andreas VoBkuhle,
743-44;
Schmidt-Afmann,
Entscheidungsspielraume der
erwaltung
(Ermessen,
Beurteilungsspielraum,
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These American and German approaches are comparable, though they
differ conceptually, and their doctrinal importance is not the same-

central in the United States, at least theoretically, more peripheral in

Germany.6 6 In Switzerland, a similar approach to the one existing in
67
Germany can be observed in several Federal Tribunal cases. In the
Netherlands, the law may grant a margin of discretion in statutory
to an agency. 68 In each case, courts must assess whether

interpretation
the legislature
independent

aimed

authority,

at granting discretionary

powers to an

for example to the Dutch Authority for

Consumers and Markets. 69 The particular expertise of the authority

70
will be an important justification for such a legislative choice. Two
comments must, however, be made regarding the Netherlands. On the
one hand, the principle of effective judicial protection tends, ceteris

planerische Gestaltungsfreiheit) [Scopes for Decision-Making of the Administration
Discretion, Latitude of Judgment, Freedom of Planning), 2008 JURISTISCHE SCHULUNG
[LEGAL TRAINING] 117, 118. For an extensive and comparative study (Germany-U.S.) of

this issue, see Oster, supra note 4.
See Oster, supranote 4, at 1295 ("Both doctrines are based on the assumption
66.
that it is the legislature who decides whether courts have to grant deference. However,
the normative authorization theory has a further prerequisite compared to the Chevron
doctrine. According to Chevron, the authorization of the agency lies in the ambiguity of
the statute. German courts require an indefinite legal term and in addition an explicit
or implicit legislative authorization to interpret the term .... The difference between the
second requirement of the German normative authorization doctrine and the U.S.
Chevron doctrine is marginal, because many of the requirements of the German 'step

two' are already included in the rationales of Chevron, e.g. the agency expertise or the
procedure.").
The Federal Tribunal is Switzerland's highest court, the Bundesgericht, the
67.
Tribunal federal or the Tribunalefederale. See Tribunal fed6ral [TF] Mar. 21, 2014, 140
ARETS DU TRIBUNAL FEDERAL [ATF] I 201, 205-06 (Switz.); Bundesgericht [BGer]
[Federal Supreme Court] Oct. 7, 2009, 135 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN
BUNDESGERIGHTS [BGE] II 384, 389-90 (Switz.); Bundesgericht [BGer] Apr. 21, 2006,
132 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN BUNDESGERICHTS [BGE] II 257, 262-63.

On this case law, see TANQUEREL, supra note 6, at 218-19, 222-23, who approves of the
Federal Tribunal's approach.
See Saskia Lavrijssen & Maartje de Visser, Independent Administrative
68.
Authorities and the Standard of Judicial Review, 2 UTRECHT L. REV. 111, 114 (2006).

See Saskia Lavrijssen & Fatma Capkurt, Who Guards the Guardians?
69.
Judicial Oversight of the Authority Consumer and Market's Energy Regulations in the
Netherlands, in JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION, supra note 16, at

133, 140-41.
See Tom Barkhuysen
70.

& Michiel L. van

Emmerik, Deference to the

Administration in JudicialReview: The Case of the Netherlands, in DEFERENCE TO THE
ADMINISTRATION IN JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 16, at 327, 339-41; Arnout P. Klap,

Rechterlijke toetsing aan vage normen in Nederland en Duitsland [Judicial Review of
Vague Norms in the Netherlands and Germany], in TOETSING AAN VAGE NORMEN IN HET
NEDERLANDSE, DUITSE, ENGELSE EN FRANSE RECHT [REVIEW OF VAGUE NORMS IN
DUTCH, GERMAN, ENGLISH AND FRENCH LAW] 1, 1 (Arnout P. Klap, F. Taco Groenewegen

& Jean Reiner van Angeren eds., 2014) (drawing a distinction between vague norms that
entail a weighing of interests, those that demand an evaluation of future events, those
that require specific expertise and those with a supranational character, as well as
combinations thereof).
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paribus, to strengthen the intensity of judicial review.7 1 On the other

"

hand, and by contrast to a certain extent, courts sometimes defer to the
interpretation of vague legal notions by independent specialized
authorities even when courts are entitled and supposed to carry out a
full review of the law.72
In Canada, a recent landmark decision of the Supreme Court7
rightfully puts the focus on the legislature's intent with respect to the
applicable standard of review, which then has implications on the
question of judicial deference to administrative interpretation of
statutes. Nevertheless, it is debatable whether the Court correctly
presumed 74 or assessed the intent, 75 and especially whether the intent
was not too generally and schematically determined. 76 Has the
Supreme Court itself applied the "modern principle" of statutory
interpretation to which it is referring,7 7 while implicitly interpreting

all the relevant and affected statutes? In any event, this decision does

71.
See Lavrijssen & Qapkurt, supra note 69, at 154-68; Barkhuysen & van
Emmerik, supra note 70, at 336-41.
72.
See Lavrijssen & Qapkurt, supra note 69, at 145-48, 159-60 and the
examples mentioned within.
73.
See generally Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov,
2019 S.C.C. 65. In this case, the Supreme Court ruled, on the basis of its interpretation
of the Canadian Citizenship Act, that a person born in Canada to parents who were
undercover Russian spies is a Canadian citizen.
74.
Id. para. 23 ("Where a court reviews the merits of an administrative decision
(i.e., judicial review of an administrative decisions [sic] other than a review related to a
breach of natural justice and/or the duty of procedural fairness), the standard of review
it applies must reflect the legislature's intent with respect to the role of the reviewing
court, except where giving effect to that intent is precluded by the rule of law. The
starting point for the analysis is a presumption that the legislature intended the
standard of review to be reasonableness.").
75. Id. para. 17 ("The presumption of reasonableness review can be rebutted in
two types of situations. The first is where the legislature has indicated that it intends a
different standard or set of standards to apply. This will be the case where the legislature
explicitly prescribes the applicable standard of review. It will also be the case where the
legislature has provided a statutory appeal mechanism from an administrative decision
to a court, thereby signaling the legislature's intent that appellate standards apply when
a court reviews the decision. The second situation in which the presumption of
reasonableness review will be rebutted is where the rule of law requires that the
standard of correctness be applied.").
76.
Id. para. 246 (Abella & Karakatsanis, JJ., concurring) ("In reality, the
majority's position on statutory appeal rights, although couched in language about
'giv[ing] effect to the legislature's institutional design choices', hinges almost entirely on
a textualist argument: the presence of the word 'appeal' indicates a legislative intent
that courts apply the same standards of review found in civil appellate jurisprudence.").
77.
Id. paras. 117-18. On the "modern principle," see, however, St6phane Beaulac
& Pierre-Andre Cote, Driedger's 'Modern Principle"at the Supreme Court of Canada:
Interpretation, Justification, Legitimization, 40 REVUE JURIDIQUE THNMIS [THtMIS L.
REV.] 131, 171 (2006) ("The construction of statutes constitutes such a complex process,
especially in the harder cases that tend to end up in courts, that it is extremely difficult
to state the proper approach to interpretation in but a few words, if it can be done at
all.").
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not close the discussion, as it will be followed by other judicial decisions
and may give rise to a reaction by the legislature. If it is not satisfied

by the approach followed by the Supreme Court, the legislature can ex
post and pro futuro change current statutory provisions within the

constraints of the rule of law and enact new statutes taking this case
law into consideration. Thus, the legislature retains a form of control
on this issue, with the caveat that each statutory provision is then
interpreted by administrative bodies and courts-a process the
legislature does not control.
In brief, the legislature must assent to judicial deference or, in
other words, enable courts to defer to administrative statutory
75
interpretation-passively and expost at the very least. This principle

seems to be common to several countries, although its
conceptualization differs from one to the next. In short, the legislature
has the control over this issue, as it can open or close the door to judicial

deference to administrative statutory interpretation. Its intent or
assent is, however, often at best implicit, which means that courts have

to determine whether and, if so, to what extent they should or can defer
to administrative bodies. 79
Finally, in a given country, administrative decision-makers that

have interpretive authority may even benefit from a "presumption of
deference," 80 to the point where one may consider that judicial

78.

Regarding the United States, see William N. Eskridge Jr. & Lauren E. Baer,
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory
Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEo. L.J. 1083, 1188 (2008) ("[A]
longstanding agency interpretation that regulated parties have internalized and that
Congress has acquiesced in should rarely be overturned .... " (emphasis in original)).
The

Continuum of Deference: Supreme

79.

From a comparative perspective, see, for example, JORDAO, supra note 16, at

345, 571-72.
Regarding Canada, the majority of the Supreme Court in the recent Vavilov
80.
decision held that all administrative decisions should presumptively be reviewed on the
reasonableness standard and, thus, receive judicial deference, unless either legislative
intent or the rule of law requires otherwise. 2019 S.C.C. 65 paras. 10, 23-72. When
applicable, this standard also covers questions of statutory interpretation-provided, in
particular, that they are not "general questions of law of central importance to the legal
system as a whole," id. paras. 58-62-and means that administrative decisions are
allowed to stand as long as they are "reasonable." In other words, the "presumption of
reasonableness review" corresponds to a "presumption of deference." See, e.g., Steven
Mason, Brandon Kain, Joanna Nairn, Richard Lizius & James S.S. Holtom, The Supreme
Court of Canada Simplifies the Standard of Review Analysis in Historic Super Bowl
Trilogy,
McCARTHY
TETRAULT
LLP
(Dec. 19,
2019),
https://www. mccarthy.ca/en/insights/articles/touchdown-supreme-court-canada-

simplifies-standard-review-analysis-historic-super-bowl-trilogy [https://perma.cc/2HZ6EULL] (archived Sept. 24, 2020) (using both concepts interchangeably). The Vavilov
decision strengthened the presumption but, at the same time, created a large exception
in the case of statutory appeals. In this respect, two Justices considered, in Vavilov, that
this decision greatly erodes the presumption of deference, 2019 S.C.C. 65 paras. 199-201
(Abella & Karakatsanis, JJ., concurring), established in Alberta. See Alberta
(Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. Alberta Teachers' Ass'n [2011] S.C.R. 654,
656 para. 34 ("[U]nless the situation is exceptional, the interpretation by the tribunal of
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"intervention should be the exception rather than the norm."81 Such an
approach may, however, be difficult to reconcile with the constitutional
role of courts and procedural safeguards in many countries. 82 In the
European context, such a presumption is incompatible with Article 6
of the European Convention of Human Rights when this human right

is applicable. 83

IV. THE CASE

FOR JUDICIAL DEFERENCE

In several countries, various aspects of administrative legitimacy
and of the principle of separation of powers (subpart A) as well as the
optimal allocation of limited resources (subpart B) may justify judicial

deference to administrative interpretation of statutes, at least in
certain cases. Humility, honesty, and transparency from the courts

(subpart C) as well as other considerations (subpart D) may also
explain some form of judicial deference.
A. Administrative Legitimacy and the Separationof Powers
The legitimacy of agencies and other administrative bodies is
based on several factors. One of the-if not the-primary bases for
their legitimacy is their expertise-and that of their officials and staff
(1). Their political accountability (2) or their independence (3) and the
political discretion that may be linked to certain areas of public activity

(4) also deserve specific mention. This list is not exhaustive.
1.

Expertise

Some government organizations, like agencies, are typically
specialized in a certain field. Their officials and staff possess specific
expertise and experience in the relevant field. Experience may lead to
expertise (the "catch-all" notion in this respect, as it includes
experience in this context), according to the terminology used in this
Article. A statute's interpretation raises legal issues, but also non-legal
ones of which courts may have limited knowledge. 8 4 In the United

its home statute or statutes closely connected to its function should be presumed to be a
question of statutory interpretation subject to deference on judicial review."). On this
presumption before Vavilov, see Daly, Unreasonable Interpretations of Law, supra
note 28, at 251.
81.
Daly, UnreasonableInterpretationsof Law, supra note 28, at 270.
82.
See infra Parts V.C-D, VI.A.
See infra Part V.D.
83.
From a comparative perspective, see, for example, JORDAO, supranote 16, at
84.
86-124; Michael C. Tolley, Judicial Review of Agency Interpretation of Statutes:
Deference Doctrines in ComparativePerspective, 31 POL'Y STUD. J. 421, 421 (2003) ("The
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States, the specific expertise of specialized agencies contributes to
85
justify both the Chevron deference, doctrine, test, or space, whichwhen applicable-requires a federal court to defer to an agency's
interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision if this
interpretation is considered reasonable, 86 and the Skidmore deference,
doctrine, test, or weight, which allows a federal court to determine the

appropriate level of deference for each case based on "the thoroughness
evident in [the agency's] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those
87
factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control."

A high level of judicial deference may take place when scientific
knowledge is required, bearing in mind that this does not mean
absence of review; mutual efforts must be made in order to establish
rigorous analytical yardsticks to guide the administrative decision
process and to provide courts with a framework against which to
88
review the administrative decisions.
In certain countries such as Canada, even administrative
decisions involving constitutional values may be subject to deference,
since "[a]n administrative decision-maker exercising a discretionary
power under her home statute, has, by virtue of expertise and
competing
the
with
familiarity
particular
specialization,
considerations at play in weighing Charter [of Rights and Freedoms]

general idea is that specialist agencies are often in a better position than courts to resolve
the ambiguities, and interpreting a statute in a way that promotes effective public policy
may depend more on the expertise of the agency and less on the limited knowledge and
modes of reasoning employed by courts.").
See generallyPeter L. Strauss, "Deference"is Too Confusing - Let's Call Them
85.
"Chevron Space" and "Skidmore Weight", 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143 (2012).
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
86.
(1984); see, e.g., The Chevron Doctrine: Constitutional and Statutory Questions in
Judicial Deference to Agencies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform,

Commerical & Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 69 (2016)
(statement of Emily Hammond, Associate Dean for Public Engagement & Professor of
Law, Geo. Wash. Univ. L. Sch.) [hereinafter Statement of Emily Hammond] ("Agencies
have experience with the statutes they administer and the challenges that arise under
the applicable regulatory regimes. Relative to the courts, agencies also have superior
expertise, particularly with respect to complex scientific or technical matters.").
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); see, e.g., The Chevron
87.
Doctrine: Constitutional and Statutory Questions in Judicial Deference to Agencies:
HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial & Antitrust Law of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 62 (2016) (statement of Richard J. Pierce, Lyle
T. Alverson Professor of Law, Geo. Wash. Univ. L. Sch.) ("The [Skidmore] test was based
on the comparative advantage of specialized agencies over generalist courts because of
agencies' greater subject matter expertise and greater experience in implementing a

statutory regime. The results of applications of the test suggest that it is deferential to
agency decisions.").
Regarding the United States, see Elizabeth Fisher, Pasky Pascual & Wendy
88.
Wagner, Rethinking Judicial Review of Expert Agencies, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1681, 1703
(2015); see also Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and
JudicialReview as Translationof Agency Science, 109 MIcH. L. REV. 733, 756 (2011).
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values." 89 However, "constitutional questions" as such "require a final
and determinate answer from the courts."90
In some countries where there is very little or no judicial deference
to administrative statutory interpretation, it is interesting to note that
expertise may not be regarded as a primary characteristic of public
administration. In Australia for instance, "expertise is a special
characteristic of some administrative decision-makers rather than an

assumed characteristic of public administration generally," the upper
echelons of the public service having been "predominantly populated
by 'generalists."' 9 1 One should be careful before drawing institutional
conclusions from this observation, which is otherwise debatable. Still,
the Australian High Court has held that "there is very limited scope
for the notion of 'judicial deference' with respect to findings by an
administrative body of jurisdictional facts,"92 but interpretation of the
law is considered as a separate matter. Indeed, the interpretation of
the law by the judiciary and judicial control over administrative
interpretation are seen as "fundamental" by the High Court. 93
Australian case law may actually give some room to various forms of
judicial deference especially relating to fact-finding and applying the
law to facts 94 due to, for instance, the specific expertise of certain
administrative bodies, 95 but the High Court has declined to adopt the

89.
Dore v. Barreau du Qu6bec [2012] 1 S.C.R. 395, 397 para. 47 (Can.); see also
Loyola High School v. Att'y Gen. of Quebec [2015] 1 S.C.R. 613, paras. 4, 35-42 (Can.).
On this Canadian case law, see LEWANs, supra note 16, at 180-83; see also Claudia
Geiringer, Process and Outcome in Judicial Review of Public Authority Compatibility
with Human Rights: A Comparative Perspective, in THE SCOPE AND INTENSITY OF
SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW 329, 349-57, 359-60 (Hanna Wilberg & Mark Elliott eds., 2015).
90.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, [2019] S.C.C.
65 para. 55.
91.
Peter Cane, Judicial Control of Administrative Interpretation in Australia
and the United States, in THE SCOPE AND INTENSITY OF SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW, supra

note 89, at 215, 222; see also Lisa B. Crawford, The Rule of Law in the Age of Statutes,
48 FED. L. REV. 159, 182 (2020) ("Undoubtedly, there are those within the executive
branch who have worked at the coalface of the relevant sphere of government activity
for many years. The legislation that governs that field may have incorporated the
technical language and concepts that these actors work with every day (but which may
be incomprehensible to a judge or generalist lawyer). But the now corpulent
administrative state is surely also staffed, in no small part, by low-grade and transitory
staff who have no great expertise in the field of government activity in which they are
involved.").; Mark Aronson, Should We Have a Variable Errorof Law Standard?, in THE
SCOPE AND INTENSITY OF SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW, supra note 89, at 241, 261.
92.
Corp. of the City of Enfield v Dev. Assessment Comm'n [2000] 199 CLR 135
para. 59 (Austl.).
93.
Id. paras. 40, 43, 45.
94.
See Stephen Gageler, Deference, 22 AUSTRALIAN J. ADMIN. L. 151, 154-56
(2015); Alan Freckelton, The Concept of Deference'in Judicial Review of Administrative
Decisions in Australia- Part 1, 73 AUSTRALIAN INST. OF ADMIN. L.F. 52, 62-67 (2013).
95.
See Fleur Kingham, Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review in
Australia, in DEFERENCE TO THE ADMINISTRATION IN JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 16,

at 39, 61-62; Freckelton, supra note 94, at 64-66; Barnes, supranote 40, at 133.
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Chevron doctrine 96 especially because of the Australian courts'
constitutional role.97

The deliberative process that takes place in many agencies or
other administrative bodies, organized as commissions for instance, is

also supposed to grant particular legitimacy to the decisions made and
to the interpretation of statutes on which they are based. However, a
deliberative process also occurs in courts when decisions are taken by
a panel of judges, and an individual judge may interact with her clerks.
administrative
the
from
resulting
legitimacy
Furthermore,

deliberative process actually depends on the expertise and experience
of the people involved. 98 Diversity in this respect can broaden and
enrich the interpretation of the statute. In principle, interdisciplinarity
with regard to non-legal questions does not exist in courts, at least not

to the same degree.
2.

Political Accountability

In some countries, administrative bodies such as agencies may not
be independent from government or may only be independent to a
limited extent; -as a result, the executive is more clearly held
accountable for their decisions. Political interference may, therefore,
exist or, depending on the jurisdiction, become inevitable. However,
political accountability is seen as a reinforcing factor of administrative
legitimacy compared to the legitimacy of the courts. 99 Accordingly,
some judicial deference in statutory interpretation cases would be
justified. The "democratic basis for distributing legal authority to
the separation of powers 01 are

administrative officials" 100 and even

also invoked in support of judicial deference regarding administrative
decisions.

Enfield, 199 CLR paras. 40-42; see Kingham, supra note 95, at 51-52, 83;
96.
Gageler, supra note 94, at 155-56.
See Kingham, supra note 95, at 83; Gageler, supra note 94, at 156; Barnes,
97.
supra note 40, at 131, 138. However, some authors now make the case for judicial
deference to some executive interpretations of law with constitutional arguments that

do not rest on new case law or legislation. See Boughey, supra note 43, at 41-53 ("[T]here
are compelling arguments for judges to take expert administrators' interpretations of the

legislation they are charged with administering seriously and prefer those
interpretations where there is a constructional choice to make." (quotation from
page 53)); see also John McMillan, Statutory Interpretationand Deference:An Executive
Perspective, in INTERPRETING EXECUTIVE POWER, supra note 43, at 24, 27-33.

98.

Regarding Germany, see BOSCH, supranote 62, at 75.

From a comparative perspective, see, for example, JORDAO, supra note 16, at
99.
53-86. Regarding the United States, see, for example, WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR.,
INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION 282-

83 (2016); VERMEULE, supra note 41, at 155.
100. Regarding Canada, see, for example, LEWANS, supra note 16, at 223.
101. Regarding Switzerland, see SCHINDLER, supra note 6, at 379-80.
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Nevertheless, the risk of political influence is, ceteris paribus,
higher where agencies or other administrative bodies are not
independent from government. Political influence may lead them to
consider elements that are irrelevant as they interpret statutes.
Therefore, one could very well argue that such a risk requires an
unrestricted judicial review of administrative decisions. In addition, an

agency's accountability from a citizen's point of view is, at best, very
indirect. In a parliamentary political system, the party, or the parties
in power can in principle be held accountable, 102 but most voters will
not cast their votes on the basis of the activities of one agency. In a
presidential 03 or semi-presidential political system, as in France for
example, are the decisions made by an agency really an important
aspect of the presidential or the parliamentary elections?
In connection with agencies' or other administrative bodies'
alleged political accountability, the separation of powers principle or
similar considerations are sometimes invoked in order to support
judicial deference to administrative statutory interpretation.104 An
ambiguous or unclear statute is supposed to raise policy issues-rather
than strictly legal ones-to be addressed first and foremost by the
executive. Indeed, constitutional or statutory interpretation is by no
means mechanical. It is nonetheless one of the judicial tasks par
excellence. 105 The interpretation of statutes often involves-significant
or modest-policy decisions;' 06 this observation eventually creates the
impression that such decisions should be made by a body belonging to

the executive branch rather than by a court. The initial remark is
correct, the second not as much, not the least because questions of law

&

102. On this issue and related ones regarding the United States, see Eskridge
Baer, supra note 78, at 1175-79. From a comparative perspective, see Robert C.
Dolehide, A Comparative "Hard Look" at Chevron: What the United Kingdom and
Australia Reveal About American Administrative Law, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1381, 1383, 139495 (2010).
103. See Dolehide, supra note 102, at 1383 ("American voters, in contrast [to voters
in the United Kingdom and Australia], cannot attribute the blame or credit for
administrative action quite as clearly: is Congress primarily responsible-since it passed
the relevant legislation-or is the President responsible, since the Executive implements
the legislation?").
104. Regarding Germany, see, for example, Oster, supra note 4, at 1273-74.
105. Regarding Germany, see, for example, Hoffmann-Riem, supra note 4, at 74041.
106. From a general or comparative perspective, see, for example, Reitz, supra
note 4, at 286; T. R. S. Allan, Deference, Defiance, and Doctrine: Defining the Limits of
Judicial Review, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 41, 42 (2010) ('In public law, ... questions of law
are rarely pure: they come intertwined with considerations of policy and public interest
remitted to other public officials to determine. In such cases, the law constitutes a
boundary that the exercise of policy discretion must respect: judges should police the
boundary while avoiding the temptation to step over it into the policy-making arena. The
challenge is to determine precisely where the boundary lies."). Regarding the United
States, see, for example, Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129
HARv. L. REV. 2118, 2152-54 (2016).
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107
A general
cannot be neatly distinguished from questions of policy.
judicial deference does not derive from this inextricable reality. It
would insulate the executive branch of government from sufficient

checks and balances. In other words, it would be a stretch to suggest
that judicial deference in statutory interpretation cases is required by
the separation of powers principle. Interpreting a criminal statute, for

instance, inevitably raises questions of policy, even if criminal law
provisions are, ceteris paribus, deemed to be less open to interpretation
than civil or administrative law provisions, due to the strict application
of the principle of legality in criminal law. However, not only but most

notably, due to fundamental rights, nobody seriously argues that
courts should defer to prosecutors' views or to agencies' decisions in
systems where the latter have decision-making powers in criminal or
quasi-criminal matters.
3.

Independence

In other countries, many agencies are independent from
government. France, with its numerous independent administrative
authorities (autoritds administratives inddpendantes), provides an

illustrative example. Independence means, inter alia, that the agencies
in question do not receive instructions from government and that their
08
president or director cannot be removed for political reasons.1 Ceteris
paribus, the risk of misinterpretation of a statute due to political
influence or pressure is reduced. Consequently, judicial checks could

be loosened.
Independent agencies are organized as quasi-jurisdictional bodies
in many countries, and, when they decide concrete cases, they follow,
to an important extent, court-like proceedings. When they review

agency decisions,

appellate courts may take into account this

institutional and procedural framework, which may lead to
deference.10 9 It is, however, questionable whether the deference
relates to statutory interpretation in such a context, especially
no particular agency expertise is necessary to interpret a
statutory provision.

107.

some
really
when
given

LEWANS, supra note 16, at 222 (regarding the interpretation of fundamental

rights); see also Mathews, supra note 26, at 185-88; The Chevron Doctrine:
Constitutionaland Statutory Questions in JudicialDeference to Agencies: HearingBefore
the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 76, 84-86 (2016) (statement of Jack M. Beermann, Professor
of Law and Harry Elwood Warren Scholar, Bos. Univ.); Yoav Dotan, Deference and

Disagreement in Administrative Law, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 761, 790-2 (2019).
108. See, e.g., VINCENT MARTENET, ARCHITECTURE DES POUVOIRS: ENJEUX ET
PERSPECTIVES POUR UN tTAT, UNE UNION D'ETATS ET LES NATIONS UNIES [ARcHITECTURE
OF POWERS: CHALLENGES AND PERSPEcTIVES FOR A STATE, A UNION OF STATES AND THE
UNITED NATIONS] 9-15, 149-53 (2016).

109.

See infra Part VLA.
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On the other hand, reduced political control is sometimes seen as
a strong argument in favor of unrestricted judicial review." 0 The lack
of political checks and balances is supposed to somehow be
compensated by such a review. From this perspective, independence
without political accountability and judicial deference do not mix well,
but one should not forget that the nature of political control differs from
the nature of judicial control."'l
4.

Political Discretion

In certain areas, decisions emanating from the executive branch
are regarded as highly political and are, thus, subject to limited judicial
review or are even exempt from it. The political question doctrine
elaborated by the Supreme Court of the United States is well known.l"
Limits may indeed be justified, but one may feel more comfortable
when they are firmly grounded in a country's statutes 1 3 or even in its
constitution, as is the case in Switzerland. 1 4
In certain cases, the political process may be regarded as the most
appropriate and legitimate or even as the only conceivable avenue in
order to address all issues and interests at stake and to lead to
eminently political decisions.1" Accordingly, little or no room is left to
judicial review. The words "separation of powers"-and not simply
"separation of expertise"-seem to be adequate in this context, though
political or diplomatic expertise may also explain cases of total or
partial insulation of the executive branch from judicial review.'1 6
Questions raised by decisions of the legislative or executive
branches, which are totally or largely immune from judicial review,

See infra Part V.E.
111. See id.
112. For a recent example, see Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 24962508 (2019) (holding that partisan gerrymandering claims present political questions
beyond the reach of the federal courts).
113. See, e.g., ROBERT H. WAGSTAFF, TERROR DETENTIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW:
US AND UK PERSPECTIVES 282 (2013) ("Parliamentary sovereignty addresses
jurisdictional matters: for example, does the court have the authority to speak? Judicial
deference is a subset: the court has the authority to speak, but sometimes it chooses not
to do so.").
110.

114.

CONSTITUTION FtDtRALE [CST] [CONSTITUTION] Apr.

18, 1999, SR 101,

art. 189, § 4 (Switz.) ("Acts of the Federal Assembly [Parliament] or the Federal Council
[Government] may not be challenged before the Federal Supreme Court. Exceptions may
be provided for by law.").
115. From a comparative perspective, see Zhu, supra note 18, at 9. Regarding
Switzerland, see SCHINDLER, supra note 6, at 379-83 (discussing the reluctance of Swiss
courts to get involved in primarily political decisions and advocating for a judicial review
of variable intensity).
116. Regarding the United States, see, for example, Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v.
Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 22 (2015) ("[T]he Court has mentioned both of the political branches
in discussing international recognition, but it has done so primarily in affirming that the
Judiciary is not responsible for recognizing foreign nations.").
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relate, first and foremost, to the-total or partial, actual or perceivedlack of justiciability of these decisions, 117 rather than to judicial
deference to administrative interpretation of statutes. The distinction
between lack of justiciability and judicial deference is, however, not

clear-cut-indeed, the concepts may partially overlap. Additionally, as
explained above, 118 the interpretation of a statute often raises policy
issues which are sometimes of great political significance.
The political question doctrine in the United States or a similar
fundamental limit to judicial review in another country should not play
an important role, if any, in statutory interpretation cases involving
agencies or other administrative bodies. It would be paradoxical to

consider that decisions made by agencies are so political in nature that
they exclude or strongly limit judicial review. This argument may be
valid for decisions, such as planning decisions, taken by the legislature,
the head of state or government, the government as a whole, or a
department or ministry, but much less for an agency or, more
generally, the bureaucracy.1 1 9
Nevertheless, agencies or similar bodies may decide on important
matters which are politically significant. They typically enjoy a high
level of discretion when adopting appropriate measures regarding
matters upon which they decide. As far as statutory interpretation is

concerned, one may wonder whether they should have political
discretion to interpret the statute that they administer. This type of
discretion would not be based on the particular expertise that, for
instance, an agency has, but solely or essentially on the political
dimension or character of the decisions to be made. A note of caution is
required here. 2 0 When decisions have such a dimension, the risk of
political interference is probably, ceteris paribus, higher. An agency or
another body-especially if it is not independent within the executive
branch-may be inclined to give great weight to the government's
12
current concerns or preferences when it politically matters, ' and, to

117. From a comparative perspective, see DALY, supra note 16, at 267-86.
Regarding Australia, see Kingham, supra note 95, at 53-68. Regarding Germany, see
BOSCH, supra note 62, at 81. Regarding the United Kingdom, see Dominic McGoldrick,
The Boundaries of Justiciability, 59 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 981, 1018 (2010) (concluding,
however, that "[t]he modern jurisprudential trend in relation to acts and decisions of the
UK executive is to prefer an analysis of issues by reference to relative institutional
competence or variable degrees of deference or weight rather than to non-justiciability.").
Regarding the United States, see Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2506-08.
118. See supra Part IV.A.2.
119. Regarding Germany, see BOScH, supra note 62, at 81, 386; Schmidt-ABmann,
supra note 60, ¶ 197.
120. Regarding Germany, see BosCH, supra note 62, at 80; Schmidt-ABmann,
supra note 60, ¶ 197.
121. Regarding the United States, see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("The agency's changed view of the standard seems to be related to
the election of a new President of a different political party. It is readily apparent that
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a certain extent, neglect what the legislature had previously decided
on the basis of other concerns or preferences. Accordingly, judicial
checks may actually protect the legislature.1 22 Any substantial judicial
deference in this context would, at the very least, be questionable and
could prove detrimental to the legislature. Political discretion may be
granted by the legislature, but it cannot be created by the executive or
the judiciary branches with the purpose of escaping legislative limits
and obligations.
Within the applicable international, constitutional, and other

limits, discretion may of course be explicitly granted by the legislature
or by the people to an agency or another administrative body in view
of the political dimension of the decisions to be made on the basis of the
relevant statute. 23 In such a case, courts should interpret, without any
particular deference, the constitutional provision or statute granting
such discretion. In doing so, they can determine the scope, level, and
limits of discretion and can thus ensure that provisions are not
interpreted outside the bounds of the relevant statute.
B.

OptimalAllocation of Resources

Judicial deference to administrative decisions may be understood
as a way for a country to optimally allocate resources,1 24 which are
usually limited, especially in small countries. Administrative officials

the responsible members of one administration may consider public resistance and
uncertainties to be more important than do their counterparts in a previous
administration. A change in administration brought about by the people casting their
votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency's reappraisal of the costs
and benefits of its programs and regulations. As long as the agency remains within the
bounds established by Congress, it is entitled to assess administrative records and
evaluate priorities in light of the philosophy of the administration." (footnote omitted)).
122. Regarding the strong potential of misalignment in the United States between
the interests and objectives of Congress and those of agencies, which are primarily
accountable to the President, see Dolehide, supra note 102, at 1394-99. If "the American
system involves significant principal-agent problems between Congress and executive
agencies, as well as between the President and the agencies," id. at 1398, political
accountability may indeed be unclear, and the related rationale for deference rather
weak. But see MARK TUSHNET, TAKING BACK THE CONSTITUTION: ACTIVIST JUDGES AND

THE NEXT AGE OF AMERICAN LAW 161-63 (2020) (not distinguishing between agencies
headed by Democrats or Republicans, on the one hand, and courts with a majority of
judges appointed by Democrats or Republicans, on the other hand). One may, however,
take into account the independence of the judiciary and, in this regard, make ceteris
paribus a difference between agencies belonging to the executive branch and courts.
123. Regarding Germany, see BOSCH, supra note 62, at 82, 109-14.
124. Regarding Germany, see Hoffmann-Riem, supranote 4, at 750-51. Regarding
the United States, see Statement of Emily Hammond, supra note 86, at 72 ("The
deference regimes are best understood as part of a larger constitutional framework,
within which courts attempt to optimize their reviewing role, the legislature's desires as
expressed in the statutory mandate, and the executive branch's policymaking
discretion.").
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and staff have specific expertise, and even though judges control
administrative decisions, they do not second-guess the reasonable

25 Judges often lack the expertise for a full
interpretation of statutes.1

assessment of the motives behind these decisions, and the systematic
appointment of court experts in all cases is costly and causes undue
delay.
Moreover, judges may ultimately adopt a deferential attitude
towards court experts appointed in a case: one form of deference would
be replaced by another. Why would it be more legitimate for the courts

to interpret the language of a statute by relying on private experts they
appoint rather than on the supposedly expert administrative body?
Isn't the latter at least tied into the administrative structure subject,

as a whole, to democratic control by the government and the
legislature? In other words, it is not clear whether the second typedeference to private persons acting as experts-is preferable to the
first-deference to agencies or other bodies acting in the public
interest.126 A general judicial preference for expert analysis over
agency analysis would raise important institutional concerns and

primafacie would not be justifiable. 12 7 A case-by-case approach would

be more appropriate in this context.
The optimal allocation of resources, which is considered here, is
essentially linked to agencies' or other bodies' specific expertise. In this
respect, it does not correspond to an additional independent reason
statutory
administrative
to
deference
judicial
supporting
to
relating
interpretation and derives from the main argument
experience
and
agencies' or other administrative bodies' expertise
made previously. 1 28

C.

JudicialHonesty, Transparency, and Humility

By stating that they defer, to a certain extent, to statutory
interpretation by administrative bodies, courts simply declare what

they actually do and are able to do. Courts neither possess the same
legitimacy as administrative bodies, nor do they possess the same level
of non-legal expertise, and they do not hide this reality. In this

125. For a rather radical approach on this issue, see LEWANS, supra note 16, at
223 ("[J]udges should hone methods for scrutinizing administrative decisions, which
focus on whether an administrative decision is transparent, intelligible and justifiable,
instead of attempting to ascertain whether its substance matches their interpretation of

the law all things considered.").
126. From a broader perspective, see, regarding the United States, ESKRIDGE,
supra note 99, at 277 ("If statutory interpretation is usually a governance moment with
consequences for public policy, then agency implementation, experience, and
experiments offer lessons and insights that judges cannot easily find anywhere else.").
127. Regarding Italy, see JORDAO, supra note 16, at 215.
128. See supra Part IV.A.1.
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perspective, judicial deference can be regarded as an act of judicial
honesty, transparency, and even humility. 129 Courts avoid the
hypocrisy of saying that they do not defer in any way, while they know
or should know that this does not reflect reality.
Once again, this approach is most often intrinsically related to

agencies' or other bodies' specific expertise. Judges know that they are
not able to fully correct the asymmetry of non-legal expertise when
they review all or part of administrative decisions. Their honesty and
transparency in this respect also send a signal to the legislature, which
can adopt corrective measures or, expressly or tacitly, approve such a

limit of judicial review. This could lead to the creation of specialized
courts or to a budget increase of the judiciary, allowing for the
recruitment of staff specialized in non-legal matters or the frequent
appointment of court experts.13o In short, transparency may open

appropriate-and possibly fruitful-inter-branch dialogue.
The European Commission is not supposed to benefit from any
judicial deference, for instance, with respect to legal questions in
competition law cases, except when it applies its own soft law.131
Hence, Union courts assess the appropriateness of interpretations of
vague legal notions made by the Commission or other bodies in the
process of law enforcement.1 32 A tendency towards strengthening the
intensity of judicial review can henceforth be observed. 133 Still, "the
Commission's record in persuading the EU Courts to accept the
theories it puts forward is significant."1 34 Therefore, theory may not
completely match reality.' 35 Of course, a note of caution is probably
justified here, as EU courts may be persuaded without exercising

129. See McMillan, supra note 97, at 27, 33 ("In a basic sense, a practice of
deference could be viewed as simply an exercise in common sense and professionalism.
It involves recognition that one's skill set may be limited and would benefit from the
practical wisdom of others.").
130. See JORDAO, supra note 16, at 201-17, 570.
131. See, e.g., Maciej Bernatt, TransatlanticPerspectiveon Judicial Deference in
Administrative Law, 22 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 275, 311-14 (2016); Heike Schweitzer,
Judicial Review in EU Competition Law, in HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN COMPETITION

&

LAW: ENFORcEMENT AND PROCEDURE 491, 497-98, 531-33, 537-38 (Ioannis Lianos
Damien Geradin eds., 2013).
132. See, e.g., Mariolina Eliantonio, Deference to the Administration in Judicial
Review: The European Union, in DEFERENCE TO THE ADMINISTRATION IN JUDIcIAL

REVIEW, supranote 16, at 165, 171; Mariusz Baran, The Scope of EUCourts'Jurisdiction
and Review of Administrative Decisions: The Problem of Intensity Control of Legality, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EU ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 292, 307 (Carol Harlow, Paivi Leino

& Giacinto della Cananea eds., 2017).
133. See, for instance, Case T-679/14, Teva UK v. Comm'n, 2018 EUR-Lex
ECLI:EU:T:2018:919 paras. 165-244 (Dec. 12, 2018), regarding the definition of the
"concept of a restriction of competition by object."
134. Bernatt, supra note 131, at 323.
135. On this issue, see, for example, Damien Gerard, Breaking the EU Antitrust
Enforcement Deadlock: Re-Empowering the Courts?, 36 EUR. L. REV. 457, 470-71 (2011).
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deference. That being said, following a given economic theory may have
13
an influence on the interpretation of competition law. s

D.

Other Considerations

Some areas are very complex, and an administrative body may be
better equipped than a court-in terms of personal resources for
instance- to amass the relevant information and take account of all
stakeholder views before making a decision. 137 Complexity, as a

practical justification for subsequent judicial deference, is, however,
tied to expertise. 138 One may regard complexity as an independent
justification, but this would, first and foremost, relate to fact-finding
139
bylaws, or guidelines, and less to
or to the adoption of regulations,
the interpretation of ambiguous or unclear statutes, especially in
adjudications. Legal interpretation, including of complex norms, is one
of the courts' core competencies.
Along the same lines, participation of interested parties in the
administrative decision-making process may give rise to a particular
procedural legitimacy, 1 40 which courts would then have to respect.
Here again, one may wonder whether this potential justification for
judicial deference really applies to the interpretation of statutes. An
affirmative answer should not be excluded, but would most probably
flow from the additional knowledge and expertise gained as a result of
the decision-making process.

Finally,

when

they

believe

that

judicial

deference

to

administrative decisions may be justified in some cases, judges should,
in principle, address this issue and try to set criteria in this respect in
order to avoid or mitigate risks of arbitrariness, and to open a
transparent debate in this respect. 141 In Brazil, for instance, a

136.

See, e.g., Schweitzer, supra note 131, at 507 ("In competition law-fact-

intensive by nature and characterized by broad and open legal terms meant to enable

the courts to translate economic theory into law-the lines between the evaluation of the
facts, the interpretation of the law and an assessment whether the facts adduced suffice
to substantiate a legal claim can easily blur. The frequently broad legal concepts gain
their full meaning in interaction with economic theory and in their case-by-case
application to a given set of situation-specific facts.").
137. On this issue, see DALY, supra note 16, at 89-110.
138. See id. at 89-90, 95, 99.
139. See id. at 252-53 ("Expertise might very well be relevant to the resolution of
major questions of policy, for example, whether genetically modified foods should be
permitted or not. Complexity, similarly, might be relevant: the question of how to
regulate tobacco products and how any regulation would interact with existing
regulatory regimes, is a polycentric question which might call for resolution by a
procedurally flexible expert body.").
140. See id. at 114-31.
141. Regarding New Zealand, see Bree Huntley, JudicialReview of Administrative
Interpretations:Lessons for New Zealandfrom the United States?, 26 N.Z. U. L. REV. 791,
817-18 (2015) ("One reason that more open engagement with the issues governing
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consistent case law on the interaction between independent agencies
and courts is missing,1 42 even though higher federal courts sometimes

tend to show deference to these agencies.

143

Brazilian courts have not,

for instance, developed a doctrine of judicial deference similar to the

Chevron deference in the United States. The same can be said about
South Korea, where judicial deference can actually be perceived in
some administrative cases.14 4 Finally, in China, judicial deference to
administrative decisions exists, but courts have not yet adopted
consistent methodologies in this regard. 45

allocation of interpretive authority would be preferable is it might be expected to lead to
better decision making. Judges forced to articulate why they are deferring, or not
deferring, to an administrative interpretation must evaluate the arguments for and
against deference, rather than relying on their instinctive conclusions. As well, such
articulation can serve as a guide to other judges, so that over time a broad consensus
emerges as to the relevance of various factors.").
142. See Eduardo Jordao, Globalization and Convergence in Judicial Review: What
Can We Learn from the Case of Brazil?, 69 REVISTA DE DIREITO ADMINISTRATIVO E
CONSTITUCIONAL [ADMIN. & CONST. L. REV.] 23, 30 (2017) ("[T]he adoption of Chevron
orientation is still unclear. The doctrine has seduced the academia and many articles
have been written on the topic, most of which urging Brazilian courts to adopt a similar
doctrine. But empirical studies have shown that actual judicial deference to
administrative agencies' decisions is still rare."); see also Eduardo Jordao & Renato
Toledo Cabral Jr., A teoria da deferencia e a prdtica judicial: um estudo empirico sobre o
controle do TJRJ a AGENERSA [Theory of Deference and Judicial Practice: An
Empirical Study of Judicial Review of AGENERSA (Independent Regulatory
Commission of Energy and Basic Sanitation of the State of Rio de Janeiro) by TJRJ
(Court of Justice of the State of Rio de Janeiro)], 4 REVISTA DE ESTUDOS INSTITUCIONAIS
[REV. OF INSTITUTIONAL STUD.] 537, 565-66 (2018).
143. See Mariana Mota Prado, Introdugdo [Introduction, in O JUDIcIARIO E o
ESTADO REGULADOR BRASILEIRO [COURTS AND THE BRAZILIAN REGULATORY STATE] 7, 11
(Mariana Mota Prado ed., 2016); Juliano Souza de Albuquerque Maranhao, A revisdo

judicial de decis6es de agencias regulatdrias: jurisdigao exclusiva? [Judicial Review of
Decisions of Regulatory Agencies: Exclusive Jurisdiction?, in COURTS AND THE
BRAZILIAN REGULATORY STATE, supra note 143, at 25, 25 & 29; Paulo Furquim de
Azevedo, Revisdo judicial de decis6es antitruste: incentivos para acordos ? [Judicial
Review of Antitrust Decisions: Incentives for Settlements?], in COURTS AND THE BRAZILIAN
REGULATORY STATE, supra note 143, at 81, 89 & 99; Patricia Sampaio & Ricardo
Morishita Wada, A regulagdo e o Judiciario: o caso do setor de eletricidade [Regulation
and the Judiciary: The Case of the Electricity Sector], in COURTS AND THE BRAZILIAN
REGULATORY STATE, supra note 143, at 135, 149; Alexandre D. Faraco, Caio Mario da
Silva Pereira Neto & Diogo R. Coutinho, A judicializagdo de politicas regulatdrias de
telecomunicagoes no Brasil [Judicial Review of Telecommunications Policies in Brazil],
in COURTS AND THE BRAZILIAN REGULATORY STATE, supra note 143, at 161, 176-78.
144. See Dong Won Kim, Finding a Model of Judicial Review for Administration:
Implications from the Chevron Case for Separation of Powers in South Korea, 21 INT'L
REV. PUB. ADMIN. 147, 153-60 (2016).
145. Qinwei Gao, Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review in China, in
DEFERENCE TO THE ADMINISTRATION IN JUDIcIAL REVIEW, supra note 16, at 105, 128-29

("[I]t is necessary for the courts to unify the standard of judicial review. In the course of
judicial review, the Chinese courts will have more experience to establish a reasonable
spectrum of scrutiny: in the field of policy making, the courts respect the margin of
appreciation of administrative organs; in the field of expertise, such as food safety and
risk regulation, the courts also loose the intensity of review; stricter scrutiny could be
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THE CASE AGAINST JUDICIAL DEFERENCE

The separation of powers principle and the concept of checks and
balances (subpart A), the rule of law or the not-too-distant-though not
synonymous-notion of "Etat de droit" (subpart B), the constitutional
role of the judiciary (subpart C), as well as procedural safeguards
(subpart D) usually support the case against a general and broad
judicial deference to administrative statutory interpretation. Agency
independence (subpart E), when it exists, and the risk of wrong
incentives, as well as other considerations (subpart F), may also
support the case against judicial deference.

A.

Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances

The separation of powers principle and the concept of checks and
balances are invoked to oppose judicial deference to administrative
statutory interpretation. 146 Without full effective control of the
judiciary over administrative decisions, checks needed for the

executive would be insufficient, and the separation of powers principle
would be disregarded. However, one has to be clear about how the
separation of powers is affected by such deference. In the United
States, it is not so much "a judicially orchestrated shift of power from

Congress to the Executive Branch,"1 4 7 but rather an eventual shift of
power to this branch from the judiciary with the supposed assent of the

Congress.1 48
This approach can perhaps be followed when general judicial
deference is considered, including with respect to decisions of deep

social, political, or economic significance.1 49 However, some deference,

applied when administrative organs make a decision on punitive penalty or the
deprivation of freedom or property rights of citizens.").
146. Regarding the United Kingdom, see, for example, Trevor R. S. Allan, Human
Rights and JudicialReview: A Critique of "DueDeference,"65 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 671, 675,
677-82, 695 (2006). Regarding the United States, see, for example, Cynthia R. Farina,
Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89
CoLUM. L. REV. 452, 456, 516-28 (1989); Jack. M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron
Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled,
42 CoNN. L. REV. 779, 836-37 (2010); Statement of Jonathan Turley, supra note 58, at
15. For a literature review, see Christopher J. Walker, Attacking Auer and Chevron
Deference: A Literature Review, 16 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 103, 110-20 (2018).
147. Kavanaugh, supra note 106, at 2150 (referring to the Chevron case).
148. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch,
J., concurring). See also Sunstein, supra note 60, at 1616 n.12.
149. Regarding the United States, see FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000); King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 484-87 (2015). The absence of
deference on a question of deep "economic and political significance" which is central to
the statutory scheme at stake is an important exception to the Chevron doctrine. It
remains to be seen whether the exception will overshadow the rule since it is difficult to
delineate the limits to the exception.
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based on several criteria, does not shake the foundation of the
separation of powers, especially when administrative decisions are still
reviewed by courts to an important extent. 150 Montesquieu, for
instance, did not insist on the process of interpreting laws: the
judiciary almost mechanically applied them to concrete cases. 15
Paradoxically, the separation of powers principle and the concept
of checks and balances are sometimes invoked to support judicial
deference to administrative statutory interpretation, as we have
seen.152 A too-extensive judicial review of administrative decisions
would give too much power to the judiciary and would create an
imbalance in favor of the latter. This goes to show that considerations
based on the separation of powers principle, the concept of checks and
balances, or even a theory of democracy are, if not irrelevant,
ambivalent. 58
B.

Rule of Law and "tat de droit"

The rule of law and the related concept of "Etat de droit""Rechtsstaat" in German-are also referred to by courts, judges, and
scholars widely or totally opposed to judicial deference to

150. From a comparative perspective, see JORDAO, supra note 16, at 536-37.
Regarding the United States, see Sunstein, supra note 60, at 1678 ("But if Congress
wants agencies to interpret ambiguous statutes, it can grant them that authority [so long
as that, and no more, is what it is granting]. If Congress wants to deny agencies
interpretive authority and require an independent judicial role, it can do that as well.
Constitutional objections to the Chevron framework are unconvincing." (footnote
omitted)); Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court, 2016 Term - Foreword: 1930s Redux:
The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 93 (2017) ("Unless such
delegations are unconstitutional, the constitutional separation of powers system
requires that the courts honor congressional policy choices. And honoring congressional
choices to delegate means deferring to agency judgments within the sphere of the
agency's constitutionally delegated authority." (footnote omitted)).
151.

MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIIT OF THE LAWS 160 (Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn

.

Miller & Harold Samuel Stone eds. & trans., 1989) (1748) ("Among the three powers .
., that of judging is in some fashion, null."); see Charles Eisenmann, L'Esprit des Lois et
la Separationdes Pouvoirs [The Spirit of the Laws and the Separationof Powers] (1933),
reprinted in hCRITS DE THEORIE DU DROIT, DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL ET D'IDEES
POLITIQUES [WRITINGS IN THEORY OF LAW, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITIAL IDEAS]

565, 575 (Charles Leben ed., 2002); see also Zeev Segal, Judicial Activism Vis-d-Vis
JudicialRestraint:An Israeli Viewpoint, 47 TULSA L. REV. 319, 321 (2011).
152. See supraPart IV.A.3.
153. See Zhu, supra note 18, at 8, 16; Tolley, supra note 84, at 432-34; see also
PAUL TUCKER, UNELEcTED POWER: THE QUEST FOR LEGITIMAcY IN CENTRAL BANKING
AND THE REGULATORY STATE 339-40 (2018) ("It is not clear that simply dropping the

Chevron doctrine would help live up to the values of constitutional democracy. If the
courts did not defer to agency interpretation ... , they, rather than the agency, would
become the de facto legislators, as occurred in competition policy: hardly an advance in
terms of democratic legitimacy."); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative
Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 514-16.
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administrative statutory interpretation.154 In France, the "Etat de
droit," the role of courts-ultimately of the Court of Cassation and the

Council of State-as well as procedural safeguards are considered to
prohibit any judicial deference to independent administrative
1 5 5 In Finland, the principles of
authorities' statutory interpretation.
legality and effective judicial protection, the right to a fair trial, and
other fundamental rights are usually interpreted as preventing this

type of deference. 156 Once a statute is enacted in Israel, its
interpretation by agencies does not, as a rule, receive judicial deference

since the view from the bench is that the courts' role is to interpret the

law. 15 7 A recent decision of the Supreme Court appears, however, to
58
lean toward a Chevron-type doctrine,1 though its actual meaning is
59
debated.1 Moreover, it is very difficult for now to foresee whether this
60
decision will remain isolated or establish an important precedent.
Both the rule of law and the "Etat de droit" imply, among other
things, public authorities' subjection to the applicable laws and the
independence of the judiciary. These notions are, however, imprecise

154. Regarding the United States, see, for example, Ronald A. Cass, Vive La
Deference?: Rethinking the Balance Between Administrative and Judicial Discretion, 83
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1294, 1322-23, 1328-29 (2015).

155. See, e.g., Jean-Louis Autin, Autoritis administratives independantes,
democratie et Etat de droit [Independent Administrative Authorities, Democracy and
Rule of Law], 93 DROIT ET SOCIETE [L. & Soc'Y] 285, 293-94 ("Etat de droit" is translated
here as "Rule of Law," as there is no exact equivalent in English; one should bear in mind
that this translation is imprecise); JORDAO, supra note 16, at 41-45, 148-49; see also
Bertrand du Marais, Les regles juridiques materielles applicables aux autoritis
independantes [Material Legal Rules Applicable to Independent Authorities], in LE
MODELE DES AUTORITES DE REGULATION INDEPENDANTES EN FRANCE ET EN ALLEMAGNE
[THE MODEL OF INDEPENDENT REGULATION AUTHORITIES IN FRANCE AND IN GERMANY]

231, 249-51 (G6rard Marcou & Johannes Masing eds., 2011). For a general view on
countries with a civil law tradition, see Craig, supra note 14, at 401 ("The conceptual
premise of US, Canadian law, and to a lesser extent UK law, that some interpretive
autonomy over legal issues should be accorded to agencies, whether on grounds of

delegation, expertise or accountability, would in general not be accepted by those [EU
Member States] in the civil law tradition."). As we shall see, some civil law countries like
Germany, Italy and Switzerland, grant administrative bodies some statutory
interpretation autonomy.
156. See Olli Maenpaa, Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review in
Finland, in DEFERENCE TO THE ADMINISTRATION IN JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 16, at

181, 188-89, 199-200.
157. See, e.g., HCJ 3648/97 Stamka v. Minister of the Interior, 53(2) PD 728
paras. 8-11 (1999) (Isr.). On the doctrine of reasonableness in Israel, see, for example,
Michael Asimow & Yoav Dotan, Open and Closed JudicialReview of Agency Action: The
Conflicting U.S. and IsraeliApproaches, 64 AM. J. COMP. L. 521, 549-50 (2016).
158. CA 7488/16 Seligman v. Phoenix Insurance Company Ltd. paras. 33-34 (a
further hearing of the case by an extended panel has been ordered, FH 4960/18, and is
currently pending; last checked Feb. 21, 2021). On this decision, see Margit Cohn,
Judicial Deference to the Administration in Israel, in DEFERENCE
ADMINISTRATION IN JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 16, at 231, 265-66.

159.
160.

See Cohn, supra note 158, at 266.
See id. at 267.
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and elusive. They would likely be misread if interpreted so as to
prevent any form of judicial deference in any statutory interpretation
cases.161 In New Zealand nevertheless, the Court of Appeal stated that

it is "fundamental and constitutionally important" to the preservation
of the rule of law that courts have the last word on questions of law.162
Accordingly, courts do not defer to statute interpretation by agencies.
Some scholars are, however, in favor of a judicial deference doctrine
similar to the one existing in Canada; they consider that there would
be no legal obstacle to having this kind of deference in New Zealand as
well.s3
Extensive self-restraint on the part of the courts could become
particularly problematic if and when it would make effective judicial
control over the executive branch difficult or, a fortiori, illusory. Along
these lines, the rule of law may limit or forbid judicial deference "on
general questions of law of central importance to the legal system as a
whole," 164 providing that these terms do not create a catch-all
instrument for courts. Besides, even if its nature differs from judicial
review, parliamentary control over agencies is rather weak in many
democracies for reasons that vary from one country to the next.
In short, an unchecked executive branch endangers or even
collides with the rule of law and the "Etat de droit." Limited judicial
deference in statutory interpretation cases, however, does not reach

&

161. Regarding countries with a Common Law tradition, see Hanna Wilberg
Mark Elliott, Deference on Questions of Law: A Survey of Taggart's Contribution and
Themes in the Wider Literature, in THE SCOPE AND INTENSITY OF SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW,
supra note 89, at 197, 214 ("[N]one of the major common-law systems actually treats
every question of statutory interpretation as a matter that must inevitably attract
correctness review. It follows that the real fault-line in the debate relates not to the
question whether deference is ever appropriate. Rather, the principal site of
disagreement is found in relation to questions pertaining to the circumstances in which
deference is appropriate and the means by which deference, when it is appropriate,
should be delivered.").
162. Wool Board DisestablishmentCo. Ltd. v. Saxmere Co. Ltd. [2010] NZCA 513,
[2011] 2 NZLR 442 at [116-17, 224] (N.Z.); see, e.g., Aronson, supra note 91, at 257-59,
260; Huntley, supra note 141, at 793-97; see also Hanna Wilberg, Deference on Relevance
and Purpose? Wrestling with the Law/DiscretionDivide, in THE SCOPE AND INTENSITY
OF SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW, supra note 89, at 263.
163. See Wilberg & Elliott, supra note 161, at 209; Michael Taggart, The
Contribution of Lord Cooke to Scope of Review Doctrine in Administrative Law: A
Comparative Common Law Perspective, in THE STRUGGLE FOR SIMPLICITY IN THE LAW:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF LORD CoOKE OF THORNDON 189, 215-19 (Paul Rishworth ed.,
1997); see also Huntley, supranote 141, at 817-18.
164. See the case law of the Supreme Court of Canada, most recently Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 S.C.C. 65, paras. 58-62. But
see Paul Daly, Vavilov Hits the Road, ADMIN. L. MATTERS (Feb. 4, 2020),
https://www.administrativelawmatters.com/blog/2020/02/04/vavilov-hits-the-road/
[https://perma.cc/MK9V-55QX] (archived Sep. 29, 2020) ("The category most apt to be
expanded after Vavilov is surely the 'questions of central importance to the legal system'
category. But the narrow rule of law basis for the correctness categories does not provide
a solid foundation for such arguments.").
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these dangerous limits. 6 5 The historical and legal context prevailing
in a country may of course lead to another conclusion. Accordingly, the

rule of law and the "Etat de droit" must be contextualized.
C.

ConstitutionalRole of the Judiciary

Many constitutions define the role or the roles of the judiciary in
general terms. Very few of them expressly mention that the judiciary
interprets the law without limits. Thus, constitutions are usually
vague as far as statute interpretation is concerned. They do not address
the question of judicial deference regarding decisions made by other

branches.
In some countries, such as Mexico, courts consider that the
constitution 166 assigns them the task to interpret statutes and,
consequently, that they cannot defer to agencies in this respect. In
Argentina, 167 federal courts see one of their roles as interpreting
statutes in federal or constitutional controversies and, thus, would not
accept to defer to agencies in this regard. In other countries, such as
Belgium and Spain, no debate on this issue seems to exist.
In South Africa, the constitutional provision guaranteeing
administrative justice, as well as the legacy of apartheid, may explain,
at least partly, why South African courts are reluctant to defer to
68 Section 33 ("Just Administrative
statute interpretation by agencies.'
South African Constitution 69 notably provides that

Action") of the

"[e]veryone has the right to administrative action that is lawful,
reasonable and procedurally fair" (par. 1) and that national legislation
"must provide for the review of administrative action by a court or,
where appropriate, an independent and impartial tribunal" (par. 3/a).
In this country, there is indeed no judicial deference to administrators

165. Regarding Canada, see David Dyzenhaus, Dignity in Administrative Law:
JudicialDeference in a Culture of Justification, 17 REV. CONST. STUD. 87, 107-14 (2012),
focusing on the idea of "deference as respect". Regarding Canada and the United States,
see Daly, supra note 14, at 720 and, from a broader perspective, DALY, supranote 16, at
291-93. Regarding the United States, see Eskridge & Baer, supra note 78, at 1169-71.
From a general perspective, see Paul Craig, JudicialReview and Judicial Deference, in
CONTROLLING EU AGENCIES: THE RULE OF LAW IN A MULTI-JURISDIcTIONAL LEGAL

ORDER 98, 99-100, 102-03 (Miroslava Scholten & Alex Brenninkmeijer eds., 2020).
166. Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, CP, Diario Oficial de
la Federaci6n [DOF] 05-02-1917, dltimas reformas DOF 10-02-2014 art. 103; see also Ley
Organica del Tribunal Federal de Justicia Administrativa [Administrative Justice
Federal Tribunal Organic Act] [LOTFJA] art. 3, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DOF]
18-07-2016 (Mex.).
167. See Pedro Aberastury, Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review in
Argentina, in DEFERENCE TO THE ADMINISTRATION IN JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 16,

at 23, 30-36.
168.

See CORA HOEXTER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 147-55, 353-55

(2nd ed. 2012); Tolley, supra note 84, at 430-32, 438 (2003).
169. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 33.
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when it comes to the interpretation of legislation. 170 In a few cases,
courts have admittedly shown reluctance to interfere with complex
decisions taken by administrators with specific expertise, but the
deference did not relate to statute interpretation.'71
In other countries, the constitution is generally regarded as
allocating the function of statute interpretation to courts without
allowing them to defer, in this regard, to administrative bodies.
Australia seems to provide a good illustration in this regard. 72 Also,
given the particular constitutional framework existing in Sweden, with
wide powers granted to administrative courts, judicial deference to
statute interpretation by agencies does not seem to exist in this
country. 173 In India, the question of judicial deference to statute

interpretation by agencies does not seem to arise "since the judiciary
inherently believes that the task of adjudicating in all aspects is a
judicial function alone."1 74 That said, in the interpretation of tax
statutes, the Indian Supreme Court does not admit to the use of
deference, but to the use of admissible and significant aid for
interpretation:
a uniform and consistent departmental practice arising out of construction
placed upon an ambiguous statute by the highest executive officers at or near
the time of its enactment and continuing for a long period of time is also an
admissible aid to the proper construction of the statute by the court and would
75
not be disregarded except for cogent reasons.i

170. See Marshall NO v. Commissioner, South African Revenue Service 2009 (6)
SA 246 (CC) paras. 3, 9, 10 (S. Afr.) (rejecting the argument that "a unilateral practice
of one part of the executive arm of government" should play any role in determining the
meaning of a statutory provision relating to VAT and holding that the meaning of such
a provision has to be interpreted objectively and independently by courts); see also
HOEXTER, supra note 168, at 282-90 (discussing the notion of "error of law" which is the
ground of review that specifically addresses wrong or mistaken statutory interpretation
by administrators).
171. See, e.g., High Court of South Africa May 9, 2005, Joubert v. National
Commissioner for the South African Police Service (6543/2004) [2005] ZAGPHC 238
(decision of medical board); Cora Hoexter, A Rainbow of One Colour? JudicialReview on
Substantive Grounds in South African Law, in THE SCOPE AND INTENSITY OF
SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW, supra note 89, at 163, 170-71 & 192.
172. See, e.g., Kingham, supranote 95, at 61-62; Cane, supra note 91, at 221-33,
237-38;

PETER

CANE,

CONTROLLING

ADMINISTRATIVE

POWER:

AN

HISTORIcAL

COMPARISON 217-18, 230, 235 (2016); Freckelton, supra note 94, at 64-66; Barnes,
supra note 40, at 133. But see Gageler, supra note 94, at 154-56.
173. See, e.g., Henrik Wenander, Full Judicial Review or Administration
Discretion?A Swedish Perspectiveon Deference to the Administration, in DEFERENCE TO
THE ADMINISTRATION IN JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 16, at 405, 407-11, 413-14.

174. Roopashi Khatri, Administrative Agency and Statutory Interpretation: A
Comparative Analysis, 1.1 COMP. CONST. L & ADMIN. L.Q. 32, 41 (2013).
175. Jagdamba Indus. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1988) 69 STC 1 para. 14 (SC)
(India) (holding that the statute at issue was silent on the matter at hand).

20211

JUDICAL DEFERENCE TO ADMINISTRATIVE

INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

121

The Court of Justice of the European Union ensures "that in the
176
interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed."
This "constitutional" mandate means that questions of law arising
from the interpretation of Treaty provisions such as Articles 101 and

102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union are subject

17 7
to full and comprehensive judicial review.
In sum, the constitutional role of the judiciary is, to a certain
extent, a question of interpretation. Courts themselves have a say in
this respect. Accordingly, they define the outlines of their interpretive
power. In Hong Kong, for instance, courts have not developed a

178
A key
doctrine of deference to agencies' interpretation of statutes.

reason may be that Hong Kong courts are of British tradition, and since

the British courts have not developed a doctrine akin to Chevron
deference, courts in Hong Kong have been firmly of the view that
legislative interpretation is a question of law for them to decide. This
assessment is also valid for Singapore, 179 even though various
1 80
arguments are brought forward in favor of a deference doctrine.

In most countries, then, one cannot say that the constitutional
role of the judiciary clearly prohibits judicial deference to
administrative statutory interpretation. The way the judiciary itself
interprets its constitutional or institutional role may go in this
direction, but it is a peculiar form of judicial self-restraint (i.e., a selfimposed restraint on the ability to defer).

D.

ProceduralSafeguards

International, constitutional, statutory, or other procedural
safeguards often require courts to fully review the merits of each case
by assessing all relevant facts in addition to the correct interpretation
of the law and its application to the facts. Case law from the European
Court of Human Rights based on the first paragraph of Article 6 of the
ECHR lays down such a rule. 181 Article 47 of the Charter of

176.
177.
178.

Treaty on the European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 326/13) art. 19(1).
Bernatt, supra note 131, at 311-12; Schweitzer, supra note 131, at 498.
See Cora Chan, A PrincipledApproach to Judicial Deference for Hong Kong,

in DEFERENCE TO THE ADMINISTRATION IN JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 16, at 203, 224,

227-28.
179.

See Eugene K. B. Tan, 'The Notion of a Subjective or Unfettered Discretion is

Contrary to the Rule of Law": JudicialReview of Administrative Action in Singapore, in
DEFERENCE TO THE ADMINISTRATION IN JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 16, at 379, 397.

180.

See id. at 396-400; see also Eugene K. B. Tan, Commercial JudicialReview

in Singapore: Strategic or Spontaneous?, 2020 SINGAPORE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

448, 472-77.
181. In case law of the European Court of Human Rights, see, for instance, A.
Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L. v. Italy, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 43509/08 paras. 61-67 (Sept.
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"fulltext":["in%20re%20a.%20
2011),
27,
menarini"] ,"documentcollectionid2": ["GRANDCHAMBER","CHAMBER"],"itemid": ["001
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Fundamental Rights of the European Union is interpreted the same
way by the Court of Justice of the European Union.18 2
When such a procedural safeguard exists, it gives rise to two sets
of fundamental questions which are normally answered by courts.
Firstly, what is the actual scope of the safeguard in question? Does it
cover all fields of law, including administrative law interpreted and
applied by agencies in the first instance? For example, the protection
of Article 6 of the ECHR extends to several areas of administrative law,
but not to all of them.1 8 3

Secondly, does a full review really exclude any form of deference,
for instance when the interpretation of a statute is intrinsically linked

to complex technical, economic, or scientific issues? The European
Court of Human Rights does not completely close the door to some kind
of judicial deference in such a situation:
In assessing whether, in a given case, the extent of the review carried out by the
domestic courts was sufficient, the Court has held that it must have regard to
the powers of the judicial body in question and to such factors as: (a) the subjectmatter of the decision appealed against, and in particular, whether or not it
concerned a specialised issue requiring professional knowledge or experience and
whether it involved the exercise of administrative discretion and, if so, to what
extent; (b) the manner in which that decision was arrived at, in particular, the
procedural guarantees available in the proceedings before the administrative
body; and (c) the content of the dispute, including the desired and actual grounds
184
of appeal.

-106438"]} [https://perma.cc/SL28-6TSJ] (archived Dec. 10, 2020); see also, e.g., Zhu,
supra note 16, at 15; Jean-David Dreyfus, Les autorites de regulation independantes au
croisement des droits administratif, civil et penal [Independent Regulation Authorities at
the Crossroads of Administrative, Civil and Criminal Law], in THE MODEL OF
INDEPENDENT REGULATION AUTHORITIES, supra note 155, at 297, 310-12; Vincent
Martenet, Le controle judiciaire et la surveillance politique des autorites administratives
independantes [Judicial Control and Political Oversight of Independent Administrative
Authorities], in LES AUTORITtS ADMINISTRATIVES INDtPENDANTES [INDEPENDENT
ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES] 183, 191-99 (Frangois Bellanger & Thierry Tanquerel

eds., 2011).
182. See, for instance, Case C-295/12 P, Telef6nica SA v. Comm'n, 2014 Eur-Lex
CELEX 62012CJ0295, paras. 51-57 (July 10, 2014).
183. On the scope of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, see
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, GUIDE ON ARTICLE 6 OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL (CRIMINAL LIMB) paras. 11-52
(Dec. 31, 2020); EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, GUIDE ON ARTICLE 6 OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL (CIVIL LIMB)

paras. 1-75 (Aug. 31, 2020).
184. On this issue, see, for example, Martenet, supra note 181, at 196-99; see also,
for instance, Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Si v. Portugal, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. Nos.
55391/13,
57728/13
&
74041/13
para. 179
(Nov.
6,
2018),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"fulltext": ["Ramos%20Nunes%20de%20Carvalho%20e%2
OSd%20v.%20Portugal"],"documentcollectionid2": ["GRANDCHAMBER","CHAMBER"],
"itemid":["001-187507"]} (last visited Dec. 10, 2020) [https://perma.cc/9D6U-6PFK]
(archived Dec. 10, 2020); Fazia Ali v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 40378/10, para. 78
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In Italy, for example, the intensity of judicial review over
independent authorities' decisions has significantly increased during
the last twenty years. 185 This evolution is notably due to the European
186
as well as to Article 6
Union principle of effective judicial protection,
of the ECHR and Article 113 of the Italian Constitution which
provides, in its first paragraph, that "[t]he judicial safeguarding of
rights and legitimate interests before the bodies of ordinary or
administrative justice is always permitted against acts of the public
administration." 187 Since an important decision of the Council of

State, 188 Italy's highest administrative court, the existence of an
indefinite
deference
Supreme
continues

legal term in a statute does not alone justify any judicial
to administrative statutory interpretation. The Italian
Court of Cassation, the highest civil and criminal court,
however to consider that judicial deference may exist when

a court faces complex economic and technical evaluations made by an

http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"fulltext":["Fazia
2015),
20,
(Oct.
%20Ali%20v.%20The%20United%20Kingdom"],"documentcollectionid2": ["GRANDCHA
2020)
10,
Dec.
(last
visited
MBER","CHAMBER"],"itemid":["001-158031"]}
[https://perma.cc/K5GX-7E52] (archived Dec. 10, 2020); Tsanova-Gecheva v. Bulgaria,
2015),
15,
(Sept.
para. 98
43800/12
No.
App.
H.R.
Ct.
Eur.
(last visited Dec. 10, 2020)
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"itemid":["001-157348"]}
[https://perma.cc/3PSW-NWCW] (archived Dec. 10, 2020); Sigma Radio Television Ltd v.
Cyprus,
App.
Nos.
32181/04 & 35122/05,
para. 154
(July 21,
2011),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"fulltext": ["Sigma%20Radio%20Television%20Ltd%20v.%
20Cyprus"],"documentcollectionid2":["GRANDCHAMBER","CHAMBER"],"itemid":["00
1-105766"]} (last visited Dec. 10, 2020) [https://perma.cc/6EED-SPPL] (archived Dec. 10,
2020).
185. See Vera Parisio, JudicialReview of Italian Independent Authorities Acts: A
Short Overview, in THE FUTURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 271, 283-86 (Jean-Bernard

Auby ed., 2019); Giacinto della Cananea, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in
Italy: Beyond Deference?, in DEFERENCE TO THE ADMINISTRATION IN JUDICIAL REVIEW,

supra note 16, at 271, 275-85; JORDAO, supra note 16, at 165-75.
186. In Italy, see Codice del processo amministrativo [Code of Administrative
Trial], Decreto legislativo [Legislative Decree], July 2, 2010, No. 104, art. 1, translated
at http://www.unaep.com/download/the-code-of-administrative-trial-codice-del-processoamministrativo-in-lingua-inglese/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2020) [https://perma.cc/L7N7G959] (archived Oct. 9, 2020).
187. Art. 133 Constituzione [Cost.] (It.), translated at https://www.senato.it/
documenti/repository/istituzione/costituzione_inglese.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/4RD8-3G7T] (archived Oct. 9, 2020).
188. Cons. Stato, sez. un., 10 marzo 2003, n. 926/04, 23-26 (It.); CONSIGLIO DI
STATO [COUNCIL OF STATE], UFFICIO STUDI [RESEARCH DEPARTMENT], AUTORITA
INDIPENDENTI E SINDACATO GIURISDIZIONALE [INDEPENDENT AUTHORITIES AND JUDICIAL

REVIEW] 7-8 (2017). See Vera Parisio, Controle juridictionnel des actes des Autorites
independantes italiennes: un bref apergu[JudicialReview of Acts of ItalianIndependent
Authorities: A Short Overview), 19 FEDERALISMI.IT - RIVISTA DI DIRITTO PUBBLICO
ITALIANO, COMPARATO, EUROPEO [REV. OF ITALIAN, COMPAR. & EUR. PUB. L.] 1, 22

(Oct. 10, 2018); JORDAO, supra note 16, at 174-75.
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independent authority. 89 For their part, the administrative courts and
the Council of State, which can appoint technical experts, 90 notably
control whether a given independent authority's statutory
interpretation remains within the margin permitted by the indefinite

legal term at stake, but are not allowed to substitute their own
judgement for that of the authority.' 9 ' Since complex evaluations made
by the authority may influence the interpretation of law and since the
appointment of experts is not systematic, some form of judicial
deference to administrative statutory interpretation or, at least, some
judicial restraint in this respect may de facto still exist in
administrative cases in Italy.1 9 2

In sum, procedural safeguards usually have an impact on the
issue of judicial deference to administrative statutory interpretation.
In this respect, the exact intensity of judicial review is determined at
the last instance by a court, be it supranational, supreme, or
constitutional.
E.

Independence

Agencies' independence has already been mentioned as a
potential-though not particularly convincing-argument for judicial
deference in statutory interpretation cases. 193 One could also claim
that said independence equates to a lack of political control and
reduced accountability in this respect. Judicial deference would lead to
a situation where unelected bureaucrats are, to a certain extent,
insulated from political accountability and liability as well as from
effective judicial review. Appropriate and efficient checks and balances
would thus be missing. Such an institutional context is therefore seen

189. Cass., sez. un. 20 gennaio 2014, n. 1013, paras. 4.1-4.3. See, e.g., Parisio,
supra note 188, at 22; Marina Tavassi, Judicial Review of Antitrust Decisions: Q&A, 2
ITALIAN ANTITRUST REV. 144, 160-61 (2015).

190. Art. 19, 63 § 4, 67 Codice del processo amministrativo [Code of Administrative
Trial], Decreto legislativo [Legislative Decree] July 2, 2010, n. 104 (It.).
191. Cons. Stato, sez. un. 26 maggio 2017, nn. 02481/2017, 26-27 (para. 5.1.2);
Cons. Stato, sez. un. 24 ottobre 2014, n.. 05274, 6 (para. 4); Cons. Stato, sez. un. 8 agosto
2014 , n. 4228, 4-5 (para. 4.1). See, e.g., Parisio, supra note 188, at 22-23; Mario Filice,
I sindacato giurisdizionale sull'attivita delle Autorita indipendenti [Judicial Review
Over the Activity of the Independent Authorities], 2015 GIORNALE DI DIRITTO
AMMINISTRATIVO [J. ADMIN. L.] 559, 568-69 (2015); Mario Siragusa, Judicial Review of
Antitrust Decisions: Q&A, 2 ITALIAN ANTIPRUST REV. 144, 150-51, 157-58 (2015).
192. See Filice, supra note 191, at 569; Roberto Giovagnoli, Judicial Review of
Antitrust Decisions: Q&A, 2 ITALIAN ANTITRUST REV. 144, 145-46 (2015); see also
CLAUDIO CONTESSA, FORME E METODI DEL SINDACATO GIURISDIZIONALE SUGLI ATTI DELLE
AUTORITA INDIPENDENTI [FORMS AND METHODS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OVER ACTS OF THE
INDEPENDENT AUTHORITIES], PUBLICATION OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE 21 (2018).
193. See supra Part IV.A.3.
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as unfavorable to judicial deference to statute interpretation by
agencies.1 9 4
The idea that the intensity of judicial review is inversely
proportional to the intensity of political control can be misleading, if
not inaccurate. They differ in nature. One should not forget that a

debate on judicial deference to statute interpretation by agencies arises
both in countries where agencies or other administrative bodies are
195
independent as well as in others where they are not.
Agencies' independence is a double-edged sword with regard to
judicial deference in statutory interpretation cases. The lack of political

accountability may prevent such a deference, but the reduced risk of
political influence in the decision-making process may support it.
Accordingly, it seems difficult to give much weight to this element.
Empirical research in a given country-with a view to understand
how institutions, their personnel, rules, or procedures actually operate
and what effects they have-may indeed show that the lack of political
accountability is more problematic than the risk of political influence.

Regardless, can courts really rely on empirical studies that are often
accompanied by unavoidable assumptions and caveats? Can a
principled discussion be based on shaky grounds, as is here the case?

F.

Risk of Wrong Incentives and Other Considerations

In the United States, judicial deference is sometimes said to
create incentives for the legislature to vote vague legislation which is
then interpreted and applied by agencies whose decisions are not fully
reviewed by courts.' 96 This line of reasoning stems from the idea that

agencies are more sympathetic to the legislature's views than courts.
This may be true when legislation is adopted, but the majority can
change and, if agencies do not enjoy strong independence towards the

head of state or government, they may be reluctant to apply certain
rules enacted by previous parliamentary majorities.
In any event, vague statutory provisions must be interpreted, the
lead interpreter being, in this context, either agencies or courts, or a
mix of both. Additionally, the legislature is usually entitled to enact

194. Regarding the United States, see FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556
U.S. 502, 547-48 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting). For a convincing rejection of this
approach, see DALY, supra note 16, at 113. Regarding Germany, see generally
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFG] [Federal Constitutional Court] July 30, 2019, 151
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 202, 291, 293 (Ger.)

&

(considering that the establishment of independent agencies must be specially justified
and compensated by an effective judicial control).
195. Regarding Germany and the U.S., see OSTER, supra note 5, at 152-53, 315.
196. Regarding the United States, see, for example, Nathan Alexander Sales
Jonathan H. Adler, The Rest is Silence: Chevron Deference, Agency Jurisdiction, and
Statutory Silences, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1497, 1543-48.
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precise rules that minimize the scope of interpretation. Among these
possibilities, it is at best unclear why the legislature would choose
vague rules with more responsibility for the agencies to interpret them.

In reality, members of a parliament often adopt vague legislation
either because they cannot agree on more precise terms, they are not
sure of the practical implications, or they would rather have agencies
and courts perform this task. 197 Strategic vagueness on the part of
Parliament, in favor of agencies as opposed to courts, does not seem to
be empirically founded.1 98 In any event, this peculiar objection against
judicial deference does not derive from constitutional norms in the
countries where it is raised.

VI. THE ROOM FOR DEFERENCE
Considering the foregoing, there may be room for judicial
deference to administrative statutory interpretation, within the
applicable international, constitutional, statutory, and other limits
(subpart A). An important, and perhaps the most convincing,
justification for such a deference lies in the asymmetry of non-legal
expertise (subpart B). Based on several criteria, the room for deference
may be more precisely defined (subpart C). Finally, some specific

comments will be made regarding Canada and the United States
(subpart D).

A.

International, Constitutional, Statutory, and Other Limits

As explained above,' 99 any judicial deference to administrative
statutory interpretation has to comply with the applicable
international, 200 constitutional, 201 and statutory limits. Other

197. Regarding the United States, see, for example, Bednar & Hickman, supra
note 49, at 1454-55.
198. On judicial deference to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous
regulations in the United States, see, by analogy, Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule,
The UnbearableRightness of Auer, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 297, 308 (2017).
199. See supra Parts III.B, V.C-D.
200. On the conformity of national law with European Union (EU) law for EU
Member States, see, for example, OSTER, supra note 5, at 161-65, 242-43.
201. Regarding the German Basic Law (Article 19 Sect. 4 in particular), see, for
example, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 31,
2011, 129 ENTScHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFAsSUNGSGERIcHTS [BVERFGE 1, 21-23

(Ger.); Aschke, supra note 30, ¶ 106; BOScH, supranote 62, at 108-14; Schmidt-ABmann,
supranote 60, ¶¶ 180-85c. Regarding the Swiss Federal Constitution, see, for example,
ScHINDLER, supra note 6, at 339. Regarding the Constitution of the United States, see,
for a fundamental critic of Chevron deference, Hamburger, supra note 57, at 1249-50
("The Constitution vests judicial power in the courts, and it staffs the courts with
judges-that is, with persons who have an office of independent judgment. Judges, in
adjudicating their cases, thus have the duty to exercise their own independent judgment
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constraints may flow from general principles or notions such as the
rule of law. 202 Courts must ensure that administrative bodies remain
203
As described, limits are usually
within these limits or constraints.
rather vague, and their precise meaning is determined through
interpretation. Courts cannot avoid this step before determining
whether to defer to administrative statutory interpretation and, if so,

to what extent.
The first set of limits relates to courts' constitutional role.
Constitutional provisions in this respect, especially as far as statute
interpretation is concerned, are unclear in most countries. To a certain
extent, the responsibility belongs to courts themselves to determine the
exact outline of their role. 204 Unless there are convincing supporting
arguments, advice against overinterpreting very general constitutional
norms may prove sound. There may, however, be historical, cultural,
or constitutional differences between countries that justify a particular

role of the judiciary. All things considered, one should expect that
courts effectively adhere to the principles they infer from the
constitution. Between a system of judicial review where courts consider
that the constitution permits some limited deference and act
accordingly, and a system where courts take the position that they are
not allowed any deference, but unconsciously or consciously sometimes
defer to administrative bodies, one may find the first more satisfactory,
transparent, and constitutionally appealing. In this perspective, courts
2 5
should state what they do o and what they are actually able to do.

The second set of limits comes from procedural safeguards and
other rights guaranteed by international human rights, when
20
applicable, as well as national constitutions. s These limits have an
important impact on the intensity of judicial review, but they do not

necessarily exclude any type of deference. 207 Courts should carefully
verify whether and, if so, to what extent the applicable procedural

safeguards allow them to defer to administrative statutory
interpretation. These safeguards notably relate to the fairness of the

about what the law is, including their own independent judgment about the
interpretation of the law. Accordingly, when judges defer to agency judgments about
statutory interpretation, the judges abandon their very office or duty as judges.").
202. Regarding Canada, see Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigr.) v.
Vavilov, 2019 S.C.C. 65, paras. 53-64 (2019).
203. Regarding Germany, see, for example, Beaucamp, supra note 6, at 197.
204. See supraPart V.C.
205. See DALY, supra note 16, at 288.
206. From a comparative perspective, see Lindseth, supra note 60, at 190.
Regarding the German Basic Law, see, for example, OSTER, supra note 5, at 51-52, 16566.
207. See supra Part V.D.
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decision-making process 208 and are usually of a constitutional or
equivalent nature. Courts may also take into account the

characteristics of the proceedings before the administrative body itself.
When the latter acts impartially as well as independently and parties
are largely involved and enjoy procedural safeguards in these
proceedings, some judicial deference may be considered as admissible
from a constitutional or a human rights standpoint. 20 9 These elements
may indeed contribute to considering that judicial proceedings, in case
of an appeal against the administrative decision, remain fair even if
there is some judicial deference. In Europe, compliance with the right
to a fair trial based on Article 6 par. 1 ECHR is assessed on the basis
of "the entirety of the proceedings conducted in the domestic legal
order." 2 10
The third set of limits is composed of statutory provisions dealing
with the relationship between administrative bodies and courts and,
more precisely, with the standard of review which the latter must
apply. Statutes regarding administrative procedure in particular may

prevent courts from deferring to administrative decisions. Few clear-

208. Regarding Canada, see LEWANS, supra note 16, at 221. Regarding Germany,
see, for example, Hoffmann-Riem, supra note 4, at 749-50; VoBkuhle, supra note 65, at
118.
209. In case law of the European Court of Human Rights, see, for instance,
Tsanova-Gecheva v. Bulgaria, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 43800/12 para. 98 (2015).
Regarding Germany, see BOScH, supra note 62, at 49, 386. Regarding the United
Kingdom and Australia, see Aronson, supra note 91, at 261 ("English and Australian
courts go more lightly on court-like bodies because they are like courts, and because they
are independent of government."); see also Allan, supranote 106, at 45-53 ("The quality
of the administrative process, insofar as it can be demonstrated, will enhance the court's
confidence that the ultimate outcome [where there is scope for reasonable differences of
judgement] falls within the permitted range. For the court is inevitably dependent, in
large part, on the inquiries and deliberation undertaken by the authority; and the closer
the correspondence between the type of inquiry conducted by the authority and the style
of analysis appropriate for courts, the more readily the court can be satisfied that all
relevant considerations have been duly taken into account and properly weighed or
assessed." (quotation from page 47)).
210. In case law of the European Court of Human Rights, see, for instance, Gil
Sanjuan v. Spain, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 48297/15 para. 30 (May 26, 2020),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"fulltext": ["Sanjuan%20v.%20Spain"],"documentcollectio
nid2":["GRANDCHAMBER","CHAMBER"],"itemid":["001-202539"]} (last visi-ted Dec.
10, 2020) [https://perma.cc/N7DM3-R4A5] (archived Dec. 10, 2020); Pasquini v. San
Marino,
Eur.
Ct. H.R.
App. No.
50956/16
para. 89
(May 2, 2019),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"fulltext": ["Pasquini%20v.%20San%20Marino"],"docume
(last
ntcollectionid2":["GRANDCHAMBER","CHAMBER"],"itemid":["001-192787"]}
visited Dec. 10, 2020) [https://perma.cc/M2VB-XK7M] (archived Dec. 10, 2020); Zubac v.
Croatia,
Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No.
40160/12 para. 82 (April 5, 2018),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"fulltext": ["Zubac%20v.%20Croatia"],"documentcollection
[https://
id2":["GRANDCHAMBER","CHAMBER"],"itemid":["001-181821"]}
perma.cc/3X7H-RFWX] (archived Dec. 10, 2020); see also EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS, GUIDE ON ARTICLE 6 (CRhIINAL LIMB), supra note 183, paras. 282, 303-04;
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, GUIDE ON ARTICLE 6 (CIvIL LIMB), supra note 183,

paras. 57, 151, 275, 287, 292, 327, 359, 411.
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cut provisions on this issue seem to exist in the many countries that
21
have been considered in this Article. 1
In several countries, the applicable limits to judicial deference
may actually lead to a nuanced approach. Administrative statutory
interpretation of deep legal, political, or economic significance or of

general questions of central importance to the legal system as a whole,
may, for instance, be subject to judicial review without any deference.
However, interpretation with a more constrained impact may not,
provided that neither the applicable standard of review nor procedural
safeguards impose an unrestrained judicial review.
B.

Asymmetry of Non-Legal Expertise

The case for or against judicial deference to administrative
statutory interpretation raises many issues. When the applicable
international, constitutional, statutory, and other limits leave some
room to such deference, the asymmetry of non-legal expertise can be
regarded as an important or, depending on the country, even decisive
element. 212 It may actually have substantive and procedural

211. Regarding the "unclearness" of Section 706 of the US Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), see Sunstein, supra note 60, at 1642-44.
212. From a comparative or general perspective, see, for example, Zhu, supra
note 16, at 11-12; Reitz, supra note 3, at 298 (". . . de facto deference may well be
universal, especially deference on the grounds of governmental expertise."); JORDAO,
supra note 16, at 152-53, 305-06, 568; DALY, supra note 16, at 72-89; Tolley, supra
note 84, at 437-38; see also Allan, supra note 106, at 43 ("When there is scope for
different answers or approaches, it is right that the court accept the solution favoured
by the public authority. Not only may the authority possess an expertise that the court
itself lacks, but it will normally be publicly accountable in ways that judges are not.").
Regarding Australia, in a prospective way, see Boughey, supra note 43, at 36-37, 45-47,
53; Regarding Canada, see Frank A. V. Falzon, Statutory Interpretation,Deference and
the Ambiguous Concept of "Ambiguity"on JudicialReview, 29 CAN. J. ADMIN. L. & PRAc.
135, 142 (2016). Regarding China, see Gao, supra note 145, at 125-29. Regarding France,
in a prospective way, see Autin, supra note 155, at 294. Regarding Germany, see, for
example, Oster, supra note 4, at 1294; BOsCH, supra note 62, at 47-50; Hoffmann-Riem,
supra note 4, at 743-45; see also Christoph Mbllers, Materiellrechtliche Bindungen
unabhdngiger Regulierungsbehorden [Substantive Norms Binding Regulation
Authorities], in INDEPENDENT REGULATION AUTHORITIES, supra note 2, at 231, 257-58
(insisting on the complexity of fact processing and time pressure that courts face).
Regarding Japan, even though deference does not relate to interpretation of statutes as
such, see Kawagishi, supra note 35, at 317-19. Regarding Switzerland, see SCHINDLER,
supra note 6, at 338-39, 341-62. Regarding Taiwan, see Cheng-Yi Huang, Judicial
Deference to Agency's Discretion in New Democracies: Observations on Constitutional
Decisions in Poland, Taiwan, and South Africa, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,

supra note 14, at 478, 482-85. Regarding the United States, see, for example, ESKRIDGE,
supra note 99, at 282-83; Dolehide, supra note 102, at 1396; Eskridge & Baer, supra
note 78, at 1173-74.
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dimensions, 213 and is comparative in its nature.214 Many other aspects

of the debate are linked to it or are rather inconclusive.
In Canada, "asymmetry and specialization" are mentioned by the

Supreme Court to justify judicial deference regarding administrative
decisions, though the Court does not systematically focus on non-legal
expertise and considers that even decisions balancing constitutional
values may be subject to such deference. 215 The Supreme Court also
mentions "the different roles of the courts and administrative bodies
within the Canadian constitutional system." 216 More precisely, a
question of law, which was not of central importance to the legal
system, could nonetheless be compatible with a reasonableness
standard where there was a privative clause (i.e., "a statutory direction
from Parliament or a legislature indicating the need for deference"), or
in the case of a "discrete and special administrative regime in which
the decision maker has special expertise." 21 7 According to a recent
landmark decision, the Supreme Court now presumes that
"reasonableness is the applicable standard in all cases," and
"[r]eviewing courts should derogate from this presumption only where
required by a clear indication of legislative intent or by the rule of
law."218 While the relative expertise of administrative decision-makers

"is no longer relevant to a determination of the standard of review," 219
it "remains a relevant consideration in conducting reasonableness
review." 220 This relates, inter alia, to the interpretation by an

213. Regarding the United States, see Adrian Vermeule, Deference and .Due
Process, 129 HARv. L. REv. 1890, 1893, 1915-16, 1919-21, 1931 (2016) ("Under resource
constraints, agencies must design procedures with a view to substance, and vice versa.
Hence procedure and substance, whether or not conceptually distinct, are pragmatically
inextricable, and agencies must calibrate both margins simultaneously. Agency
authority over substance, explicitly or implicitly delegated by Congress and justified by
agency expertise, necessarily implies authority over procedure as well." (quotation from
page 1931)).
214. Regarding the United States, see VERMEUiLE, supra note 41, at 156.
215. Dore v. Barreau du Quebec [2012] 1 S.C.R. 395, para. 47 (Can.); see also
Loyola High School v. Quebec (Attorney General) [2015] 1 S.C.R. 613, paras. 4, 35-42.
On this case law, see, for example, Daly, Deference on Questions of Law, supra note 14,
at 707 ("The best answer to a question of law might come from a delegated decisionmaker more familiar than a court with the particular area of law."); LEWANS, supra
note 16, at 181-82. For a nuanced and somehow dubitative view in this respect, see
Aronson, supra note 91, at 247-48, 261.
216. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, para. 55 (Can.).
217. Dunsmuir, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, para. 47; see also Smith v. Alliance Pipeline
Ltd. [2011] 1 S.C.R. 160, paras. 26-40 (Can.). On this case law, see, for example, Paul
Daly, Struggling Towards Coherence in Canadian Administrative Law? Recent Cases on
Standard of Review and Reasonableness, 62 McGILL L.J. 527, 532, 540 (2016)
[hereinafter Daly, Struggling Towards Coherence]; Craig, supra note 11, at 399-400,
402-03 (agreeing with this approach).
218. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 S.C.C. 65,
para. 10 (Can.).
219. Id. para. 31.
220. Id. paras. 31, 93.
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administrative body of the statute it administers, except when
"constitutional questions, general questions of law of central
importance to the legal system as a whole and questions related to the
jurisdictional boundaries between two or more administrative bodies"

are at stake. 221 Furthermore, the asymmetry of expertise may also
play a role even when correctness is the applicable standard of review,
as mixed questions of law and fact are subject to a deferential
standard. 222 Finally, expertise and institutional experience may be a
reason "for the legislature to delegate the administration of a statutory
scheme to a particular administrative decision maker." 223 In this
regard, putting responsibility and accountability on the legislature
appears quite sound in a democratic system.
In the United Kingdom, the Supreme Court has rendered relevant
224
According to
decisions according deference with regard to tribunals.
the relevant case law, there are limits to substitution of judgment with
regard to questions of law in cases where decisions of a tribunal are
challenged before a court. 225 There is not yet a definitive case as to
whether the same reasoning might apply in other contexts, for instance
in the case of an agency with expertise in its particular assigned field.
It is difficult to predict whether the Supreme Court of the United
Kingdom would extend its reasoning to such a situation, or whether it
would confine it to the sphere of tribunals. Arguments could weigh in

favor of either side, and a nuanced approach may be appropriate. 226

Considering especially agencies' special expertise, prominent scholars
22 7
favor extension of the reasoning outside this sphere.

221. Id. paras. 17, 53, 119 ("The specialized expertise and experience of
administrative decision makers may sometimes lead them to rely, in interpreting a
provision, on considerations that a court would not have thought to employ but that
actually enrich and elevate the interpretive exercise."). The second and third categories
of questions are especially relevant with respect to the interpretation of statutes.
222. See Paul Daly, The Vavilov Framework and the Future of Canadian
Administrative Law, 33 CAN. J. ADMIN. L. & PRAC. 111, 121 (2020) ("It is, nonetheless,
difficult to be categorical about the likely consequences of Vavilov for economic
regulation and professional discipline, where the expertise of decision-makers is wellestablished as a matter of social fact even if it is henceforth irrelevant as a matter of
legal doctrine. Much will depend, therefore, on the willingness of first-instance judges to
categorize matters coming within the expertise of regulators as questions of law [subject
to correctness review] or as mixed questions [subject to review for palpable and
overriding error] . . . . And one wonders whether, despite the injunction to perform
correctness review on extricable questions of law, courts hearing appeals from
specialized administrative decision-makers will nevertheless give significant or perhaps
even dispositive weight to the decision-makers' views on matters within their expertise.
Deference might not be dead yet."(footnote omitted)).
223. Vavilov, 2019 S.C.C. 65, para. 29.
224. See, e.g., R (Cart) v. Upper Tribunal [2011] UKSC 28; R (Jones) v. First Tier
Tribunal [2013] UKSC 19.
225. See R (Cart), [2011] UKSC at [43]; R (Jones), [2013] UKSC at [44].
226. See, e.g., Aronson, supranote 91, at 253.
227. See, e.g., Craig, supra note 14, at 391-94, 402-03.
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In the European Union, the specific expertise of the European
Commission-specifically of the Directorate-General (DG) for
Competition-may lead to some judicial deference in complex economic
appraisals relevant for the interpretation of competition law norms,
though it is now considered that said appraisals are subject to full
judicial review.228
The asymmetry of expertise between administrative bodies and
courts may first and foremost play a role when the interpretation of
statutory provisions requires technical, economic, or scientific
expertise in particular. The term "non-legal expertise" may seem
counterintuitive or even inapt in this context, as expertise usually
refers to facts rather than law. However, the point is made here that
technical expertise, for instance, may be useful or even required to
interpret some statutory provisions. 229 In the United States, the
Supreme Court has suggested that the relevant experience and
expertise may extend to the interpretation of complex statutory
schemes of regulation. 230 For instance, the term "dangerous
substances" used in a statute needs to be interpreted. This task very
likely requires having deep theoretical and empirical knowledge of
chemistry, biology, and other scientific fields, as well as of the various
factual situations in which the application of the provision in question

can be considered. The distinction between law and fact definitely
comprises a grey zone, 231 not least because some issues raise mixed
questions of law and fact. 23 2 Indeed, the prohibition on "dangerous

228. See Schweitzer, supra note 131, at 509-11, 531-33, 537-38 (noting the
evolution in the case law of the European Court of Justice and concluding, on page 538,
with these words: "Whether there is a need to adapt the procedural framework or
practice to the new challenge of ensuring full judicial review in the light of an increased
use of complex economic methodologies is a matter of debate. In some cases, courts may
want to make broader use of court-appointed experts in the future. Yet, the greatest
difficulty may not lie in understanding economic theories typically presented in some
clarity by the parties, but in aptly translating them into law. This is a genuinely legal
task." (footnotes omitted)).
229. Regarding the United States, see Sunstein, supra note 60, at 1626-29, 1673
(distinguishing between,"purely legal expertise" and "technical expertise"); TUSHNET,
supra note 122, at 159 ("Whatever the case for Chevron itself, it does seem true that for
highly technical judgments, agency expertise is often helpful in figuring out the best
interpretation of a statute.").
230. See United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 227-28, 235 (2001); Barnhart v.
Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222, 225 (2002).
231. See, e.g., Daly, supra note 14, at 705.
232. Regarding Canada, see, for example, Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 S.C.C. 65, para. 37 (Can.). Regarding the United States,
see, for example, The Chevron Doctrine: Constitutional and Statutory Questions in
Judicial Deference to Agencies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform,
Commercial and Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 41 (2016)
(prepared statement of John F. Duffy, Professor of Law, University of Va. L. Sch.)
("Congress might also consider recognizing the traditional view that, in formal agency
adjudicatory proceedings, some issues decided by the agency are not pure issues of
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relevant

administrative body must also determine criteria to evaluate a
substance's danger and set limits beyond which a prohibition is
justified. 2 33 In other words, it must not only determine whether some

substances are dangerous, but also-at least to a certain extentdefine what "dangerous" means. By doing so, it interprets or constructs

the relevant statute. The same can be said of the term "relevant
market" widely used in competition law. What is a market? What does

relevancy mean? Criteria based on economic theories and data analysis
must be defined in order to answer these questions and interpret these

terms. 234
Of course, the difference between legal and non-legal expertise is
vague. Judges should determine at what moment they get out of their
actual and-from the legislature-reasonably expected zone of
expertise. When they act accordingly in an honest, reasoned, and
transparent manner and comply with the applicable international,
constitutional, statutory, and other constraints, they are up to their

judicial task 235 and create valuable case law. The test cannot be
subjective, as it would produce personal and unpredictable results;

judicial deference should not depend on each judge. Accordingly, judges
must, to a certain extent at least, carefully objectivize and
institutionalize the notion of asymmetry of expertise and, hence, the
concept of judicial deference.23s In Germany, for example, certain

administrative decisions are complex and based on ongoing
2 37
a
developments, where courts reach their functional limitations;
licensing procedure
38
illustration here. 2

for a nuclear

power plant provides a good

statutory interpretation but are instead mixed questions of law and fact. For such
questions, a reviewing court might provide deference to the agency not because of the
agency's abilities at statutory interpretation, but because of the agency's superior ability
to apply a statutory concept to the specific factual context in that adjudication.").
233. For similar examples, see Bednar & Hickman, supra note 49, at 1448.
234. See Viktoria H. S. E. Robertson, The Relevant Market in Competition Law: A
Legal Concept, 7 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 158 (2019). In the European Union, see

the Commission Notice on the Definition of Relevant Market for the Purpose of
Community Competition Law, 1997 O.J. (C 372/5) (this notice has been subject to a
public consultation in 2020 and may be updated in 2021).
235. Regarding the UK, see Rebecca Williams, When is an Error Not an Error?
Reform of JurisdictionalReview of Errorof Law and Fact, 2007 PUB. L. 793, 799.
236. From a comparative perspective, see JORDAO, supra note 16, at 541-42; see
also DALY, supra note 16, at 86; Tan, supra note 179, at 400 ("Any claims of specialised

knowledge or expertise must be rigorously tested."). Regarding Canada, see Edmonton
(City) v. Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping Ctrs. Ltd., [2016] 2 S.C.R. 293, para. 33
(Can.).
237. See, e.g., Oster, supra note 4, at 1275, 1294.
238. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFG] [Federal Constitutional Court] July 8,
1982, 61 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 82, 110-16

(Ger.).
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The asymmetry of non-legal expertise is especially of importance
when the interpretation of statutory provisions explicitly or implicitly
requires making some predictions in uncertain situations or specific
appraisals or assessments.23 9 Interpretation of the words "dangerous,"

"feasible," "reasonable," or "apt" may illustrate this point, notably in
the United States, especially when they are used in a context that
requires such expertise. 240 There is a difference between the statutory
ban of "violent video games" for minors and the one of "video games
likely to cause violent behaviors" in countries where the constitution
allows such prohibitions. Ceteris paribus, judicial deference may be
admissible solely or particularly for the interpretation of the second
type of prohibition.
The initial asymmetry of non-legal expertise does not mean that
courts do not carry any responsibility to correct it, partially or
completely depending on the case. 24 1 Courts should in principle not
24
presume it 242-Canada may partly be a special case here -and can

.

239. Regarding Germany, see, for example, Oster, supra note 4, at 1272
("Indefinite legal terms [unbestimmte Rechtsbegriffe] are terms that require a valuation.
Mostly there is no assured scientific knowledge to conclude if a certain statutory
requirement is met or not . . . . Strictly speaking, these are not legal terms, but terms
from natural, economic or other sciences used in a statute."). Regarding the United
States, see Sunstein, supra note 60, at 1628 (raising the following hypotheses: "If ..
ambiguities cannot be resolved without the application of technical expertise, the
pragmatic argument for Chevron would be more forceful. So too if resolution of
ambiguities would not be possible without resort to judgments of value that are best
made by a politically accountable entity." (footnote omitted)); see also, from a broader
perspective, Eskridge & Baer, supra note 78, at 1174 ("Typically, agencies are much
better equipped to handle issues of uncertainty than courts are.").
240. Regarding the United States, see Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Neoclassical
AdministrativeLaw, 133 HARV. L. REV. 852, 893 (2020) (referring, with respect to judicial
deference, to "cases in which there is no surface upon which traditional lawyers' tools
can have purchase, such as commands that the agency be 'reasonable' or act 'in the public
interest' when those phrases are not terms of art"); Kavanaugh, supranote 106, at 2153;
Bednar & Hickman, supra note 49, at 1448-49.
241. Regarding Germany, see Aschke, supra note 30, para. 130.
242. Regarding Canada, see Joseph T. Robertson, Administrative Deference: The
Canadian Doctrine that Continues to Disappoint 68 (Apr. 18, 2018) (unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3165083
[https:
//perma.cc/R7XH-F6XU] (archived Sept. 27, 2020). Regarding Germany, see Klaus
[ADMINISTRATIVE
Schbnenbroicher, § 40, in VERWALTUNGSVERFAHRENSGESETZ
PROCEDURE ACT] para. 94 (Thomas Mann, Christoph Sennekamp & Michael Uechtritz
eds., 2d ed. 2019). Regarding the United Kingdom, see Allan, supra note 106, at 51;
Aileen Kavanagh, Defending Deference in Public Law and ConstitutionalTheory, 126
L.Q. REV. 222, 226 (2010) ("[T]he question about relative competence, expertise and
legitimacy must be judged on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all the contextual
factors relevant to the deference inquiry.").
243. See Edmonton (City) v. Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping Ctrs. Ltd., [2016]
2 S.C.R. 293, para. 33 (Can.) ("[A]s with judges, expertise is not a matter of the
qualifications or experience of any particular tribunal member. Rather, expertise is
something that inheres in a tribunal itself as an institution...."). But see, in this case,
the joint dissenting opinion. Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping Ctrs., [2016] 2 S.C.R.
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appoint experts where and when they are validly required to do so or
deem it necessary. Nevertheless, the systematic appointment of
experts to deal with the subject matter of all challenged administrative
statutory interpretations is neither realistic nor appropriate from a

cost, efficiency, or even justice perspective. 244 In a challenge to a
statute's interpretation, should an expert really be appointed if no clear
24 5
The asymmetry of
and potentially decisive argument is brought?
non-legal expertise must ultimately be assessed after taking into
account the reasonable and realistic possibility of appointing experts
246
in the relevant fields.

The mere asymmetry of non-legal expertise does not necessarily
mean that administrative statutory interpretation should, in most

cases, benefit from judicial deference. Such a general approach would

24 7 and legal framework of
most likely not fit within the constitutional
many countries. To be constitutionally admissible, judicial deference
has to be framed by criteria and assessed in the relevant context.

C.

Conceivable Criteriafor Deference

Several criteria, needed to admit judicial deference to
administrative statutory interpretation, are conceivable. They differ

depending on whether the legislature has explicitly or actively (1) or
only implicitly or passively (2) enabled courts

to exercise such

deference.
1.

Explicitly or Actively Enabling Judicial Deference

Judicial deference to administrative statutory interpretation may
explicitly be imposed or permitted by statute. In such a case, courts

293, para. 85 (C6te and Brown, JJ., dissenting) ("Courts must not infer from the mere
creation of an administrative tribunal that it necessarily possesses greater relative
expertise in all matters it decides, especially on questions of law."). In the recent Vavilov
decision, the Supreme Court seems to insist on "demonstrated experience and expertise."

Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 S.C.C. 65, para. 93
(Can.). Regarding the presumption of deference in Canada, see supra Part III.C.
244. See JORDAO, supra note 16, at 214-15.
245. Regarding Germany, see BOScH, supra note 62, at 73-74, 385-86, who
provides an answer to this question in the negative.

246.
247.

Regarding Germany, see Aschke, supranote 30, ¶¶ 130-31.
Regarding Germany, see Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal

DES
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN
129
2011,
31,
May
Court]
Constitutional
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 1, 22-23 (Ger.); Aschke, supra note 30,

¶ 130; see also Markus Ludwigs, Verfassung im Allgemeinen Verwaltungsrecht:
Bedeutungsverlust durch Europdisierungund Emanzipation? [Constitution in General

Administrative Law: Loss of Significance Due to Europeanizationand Emancipation?],
2015 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR VERWALTUNGSRECHT [NEW J. FOR ADMIN. L.] 1327, 1329

and Schmidt-ABmann, supra note 60, ¶ 191, who both refer to Article 19, § 4 of the
German Basic Law (access to courts).
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still have to verify that the relevant statute does not violate the
constitution or international law in countries where the supremacy of
the one or the other over statutes is legally enforceable. A general
authorization of judicial deference, granted by the legislature, may
prove unconstitutional or contrary to general principles such as the
rule of law in many countries; accordingly, the legislature would have
to consider the situations in which judicial deference specifically makes
sense and is authorized or enabled. However, an explicit and specific
authorization does not mean that courts do not face difficult questions.
Firstly, when courts are expressly allowed but are under no
obligation to defer to administrative statutory interpretation, they
must define criteria under which they will use this option. 248 The
statutory provision must, therefore, be interpreted with the applicable
methods and canons of construction. If this does not lead to clear
results, courts may then refer to the criteria below relating to
situations where the legislature has implicitly, or even passively,
enabled judicial deference. 249
Secondly, the precise intensity of deference is most likely not
defined in the relevant statute. Courts themselves must address this
issue. 250 There may be a gradation in intensity depending on the types
of cases subject to judicial review. The highest level of intensity of
deference could occur when the criteria below are cumulatively met. 25 1
Speaking of "explicitly or actively enabling judicial deference"
rather than only of "explicitly enabling judicial deference" is preferred
in this Article. The two adverbs should largely be considered as
synonymous, but not completely. There may be situations where the
interpretation of a statute according to the applicable methods and
canons of construction clearly and unequivocally leads to the
conclusion that the legislature specifically addressed the issue of
judicial deference and wanted courts to defer to administrative
statutory interpretation, though no explicit wording was formulated in
the relevant statute.252 In such a situation, one may consider that the
authorization was active, though not explicit. In some countries, a
statute can contain a so-called "qualified silence" which has normative
value. 253 In others, a textual interpretation of statute precludes or
limits such an approach.

248. See, e.g., Kavanagh, supra note 242, at 223.
249. See infra Part VI.C.2.
250. Regarding Switzerland, see SCHINDLER, supra note 6, at 383.
251. See infra Part VI.C.2.
252. Regarding Germany, see BOScH, supra note 62, at 121.
253. Regarding Switzerland, see, for instance, Bundesgericht [BGer] Oct. 18, 2011,
138 ENTsCHEIDUNGEN DES ScHWEIZERIScHEN BUNDESGERIcHTS [BGE] II 1, 4 (Ger.);
MOOR, FLUCKIGER & MARTENET, supra note 29, at 150.
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Implicitly or Passively Enabling Judicial Deference
From a comparative perspective, there are very few examples of

active authorization for courts to defer to administrative statutory

interpretation. In most countries considered in this Article, the
authorization or, better, the enablement is regarded, at best, as
implicit or passive, depending on the country or the circumstances.
This supposes that the applicable international, constitutional,
statutory, and other constraints leave room for such deference.
The three initial steps of judicial analysis consist of determining
whether a statute allows a margin of interpretation or construction in
25 4
verifying
light of the applicable methods and canons of construction,
that the administrative statutory interpretation remains within this
margin, and carefully interpreting and respecting the applicable
international, constitutional, statutory, and other constraints framing
2 55
The
the potential for deference, generally or in the individual case.
distinction between clarity and ambiguity of a statute is itself blurry
2 56 and courts
and subject to different opinions and interpretations,
25 7
should really strive to find the meaning of a statute.
Nevertheless,

there may be situations where, despite judges' best efforts and good
will, a statutory provision really allows a margin of interpretation in
258
(i.e., in
light of the applicable methods and canons of construction,
light of the various interpretive principles and not only the textual
ones). 2 ss One could argue that the first step is unnecessary and that
administrative
the
whether
assess
directly
should
courts
interpretation remains compatible with the applicable methods and
canons of construction. Interpretation of the law is, however, a
fundamental judicial task, and courts bear a responsibility in this

respect. Hence, deference should not be the starting point-the
applicable legal regime may, however, be special in a given country-

254. On this issue, see, for example, Scalia, supra note 153, at 517, 520-21.
255. On this issue, see JORDAO, supranote 16, at 567-70.
256. Regarding the United States, see, for example, Richard M. Re, Clarity
Doctrines, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 1497, 1505-21 (2019). With respect to Chevron, see id. at
1531-40.
257. Regarding the United States, see especially Kavanaugh, supra note 106, at
2134-56; see also Sunstein, supra note 60, at 1672-73. In a recent decision relating to the
interpretation of an agency's regulations, but quoting the Chevron decision, the Supreme
Court made clear that "before concluding that a rule is genuinely ambiguous, a court
must exhaust all the 'traditional tools' of construction." Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400,
2415 (2019) (citation omitted).
258.

From a comparative perspective, see Daly, Deference on Questions of Law,

supra note 14, at 700-01. Regarding Canada, see Falzon, supra note 212, at 145-49.
Regarding the United States, see Sunstein, supra note 60, at 1673 ("[S]ome ambiguities
are real and others are merely apparent. They disappear on reflection.").
259. Regarding Canada, see Robertson, supra note 242, at 67.
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and the sole focus should not lie on the administrative body's
interpretive task.
There should be, in principle, no judicial deference with respect to
these three steps,26 o which also ensure that administrative bodies are
ultimately bound to the same methods and canons of construction 26 1
and that their interpretation of a statute is neither unreasonable nor
arbitrary.2s2 There may be strong arguments against the idea that
administrative bodies, in which lawyers do not necessarily have the
final say, should apply the same methods and canons of construction
as courts. 263 In difficult cases, where appeals come almost certainly,
they have to convince judges 264 and must, at least, follow judicial
precedent and remain sensitive to judicial methods of interpreting
laws. 2ss It does not make them "master[ies] of the principles of

&

260. Regarding the first step in the United States, see Sunstein, supra note 60, at
1679 ("[I]t is both correct and important to insist that it is for judges, not agencies, to
decide whether statutes contain ambiguities, and whether they delegate lawinterpreting power."); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN & ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW
LEVIATHAN: REDEEMING THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 136, 138 (2020).

&

261. On this point, see, regarding Australia, Cane, supra note 91, at 238 ("[B]oth
normatively and strategically, administrators should approach interpretation in
precisely the way a court would, applying the same rules, principles and modes of
reasoning." (footnote omitted)); regarding Canada, Canada (Minister of Citizenship
Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 S.C.C. 65, para. 120 (Can.) ("But whatever form the
interpretive exercise takes, the merits of an administrative decision maker's
interpretation of a statutory provision must be consistent with the text, context and
purpose of the provision. In this sense, the usual principles of statutory interpretation
apply equally when an administrative decision maker interprets a provision."). See also
Paul Daly, The Struggle for Deference in Canada, in THE SCOPE AND INTENSITY OF
SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW, supra note 84, at 297, 322 ("Administrative decision-makers are
taught by reviewing courts that it is better to think like lawyers, even if the legislature's
goal of empowering administrative decision-makers in the first place was to avoid having
decisions made by people who think like lawyers." (footnote omitted)).
262. On this last point, see OSTER, supra note 5, at 313; Sunstein, supra note 60,
at 1673, 1678.
263. Regarding Canada, see Daly, Unreasonable Interpretations of Law, supra
note 28, at 257-58, 264-66 (considering that "[a]n applicant for judicial review must first
identify indicia of unreasonableness that afflict a decision" such as "[i]llogicality,
inconsistency with statutory purpose or underlying values, differential treatment and
unexplained changes in policy"). Are these elements not some of the ones that are covered
by the applicable methods and canons of construction in many jurisdictions? On the
interpretation with the help of logical arguments, see, from a combined (Austrian,
German & Swiss) perspective, ERNST A. KRAMER, JURISTISCHE METHODENLEHRE [LEGAL

METHODOLOGY] 183-84, 194-96 (6th ed. 2019); see also, from an Austrian perspective,
FRANZ BYDLINSKI & PETER BYDLINSKI, GRUNDZ iGE DER JURISTISCHEN METHODENLEHRE
[FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL METHODOLOGY] 52-55 (3rd ed. 2018).

&

264. Regarding Canada and the United States, see Paul Daly, Doubts About
Deference: Chevron USA v. Natural Resources Defence Council, 32 CAN. J. ADMIN. L.
PRAC. 137, 147 (2019).
265. Regarding English and Australian law, see CANE, supra note 172, at 236-38.
Regarding the United Kingdom, see CRAIES ON LEGISLATION: A PRACTITIONERS' GUIDE
TO THE NATURE, PROCESS, EFFECT AND INTERPRETATION OF LEGISLATION 737-38 (Daniel

Greenberg ed., 11th ed. 2017).
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ss as various methods-not just this last one-

267
True, it is possible
and canons of construction may come into play.

that no consensus exists among judges on the applicable methods and
268
Each judge should
canons of construction or the way to ponder them.
nevertheless interpret a statute by using the methods and canons she
allowably considers appropriate and, if no clear conclusion comes out

of this process, verify that the administrative interpretation of the

-

relevant statute remains compatible with the same methods and
canons.
2 69
The obligation to remain within the margin of interpretation
270
or, in other words, within the "construction zone" -determined in
light of the applicable methods and canons of construction, does not

mean that the administrative body has made the best use of these
methods and canons, 271 but that its statute interpretation is
compatible with them or, in other words, remains admissible or
defensible in light of them. These criteria represent a way to partly
27 2
formalize the "reasonableness test" applied in several jurisdictions.
Incidentally, on the basis of these canons, the U.S. Supreme Court

266.

Daly, UnreasonableInterpretationsof Law, supra note 28, at 266.

267. Regarding Austria, Germany, and Switzerland, see, for example, WANK,
supra note 30, at 41-75; KRAMER, supra note 263, at 63-203; BYDLINSKI & BYDLINSKI,

supra note 263, at 27-79; regarding the United Kingdom and, more generally, common
law countries, see, for example, DIGGORY BAILEY & LUKE NORBURY, BENNION ON
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 283-327 (7th ed. 2017).
268. See, e.g., JORDAO, supra note 16, at 250-51, 370-72. Regarding the United

States, see Bednar & Hickman, supranote 49, at 145-53.
269. Regarding Germany, see Aschke, supra note 30, ¶ 133.
270. See Solum & Sunstein, supra note 43, at 1470, 1472, 1475, 1482, 1487; see
also Claire R. Kelly, The Brand X Liberation: Doing Away with Chevron's Second Step
as Well as Other Doctrines of Deference, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 151, 189-95 (2010).
271. Regarding the United States, see Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and
Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367, 2398-400, 2403 (2020) (Kagan, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
272. Regarding the United Kingdom, see Williams, supranote 235, at 800-01, 804,
808 (emphasis omitted) (distinguishing "between true jurisdictional error, where the
decision-maker fails to reach an objectively verifiable standard and the court can
intervene automatically to correct this by substituting the correct answer, and excess of

jurisdictional discretion, where the definition and application of a jurisdictional
condition such as 'illegal entrant' contains a degree of discretion and the court can only
exercise rationality review in accordance with the normal principles, taking account of
relative institutional competence along with other advantages and disadvantages of
intervention." (quotation from page 808)). On this issue, see also Daly, Struggling
Towards Coherence?, supra note 217, at 557 ("Badges of unreasonableness must be
identified in order to justify striking down a decision . . . Notably, the indicia of
unreasonableness can be drawn from the same sources as the contextual factors that
make up the range of reasonable outcomes: inconsistent decisions, for instance, sound in

the rule of law; whereas decisions that fail to take into account important statutory
language do violence to the democratic principle. And, in general, ensuring that decisions
respect the fundamental precepts of the legal system is a means of upholding the rule of
law." (footnotes omitted)).
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might have reached the same conclusion in the Chevron case as it did,
without needing to develop a specific doctrine of deference. 2 73
Should a special and separate "reasonable and not arbitrary test"
be additionally conducted if it is not foreseen by the applicable law or
case law? Unreasonable or arbitrary statutory interpretation will most
certainly conflict with the methods and canons of constructionreasonableness includes, from this perspective, compliance with
principles of statutory interpretation 274 -or
the applicable
international, constitutional, and statutory constraints. Depending on
the jurisdiction, canons of construction, constitutional, and other
constraints may anyway single out the same issue. For instance, the

absence of deference when statute interpretation raises questions of
deep social, economic, and political significance 275 may be regarded as
a canon of construction2 7 6 or a constitutional constraint. The same can

be said of the obligation to interpret a statute so as to stay away from
the terrain of constitutional doubt.2 77
Courts must then determine whether the legislature has
implicitly or passively enabled them to defer to administrative
interpretation of statutes. 278 There should be no judicial deference to
administrative decisions with regard to this issue. 279 The asymmetry
of non-legal expertise between administrative bodies and courts may
play an important role in the eyes of the legislature but is not

&

&

&

273. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Without Chevron, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 59, 7375 (2019).
274. Regarding Canada, see Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v.
Vavilov, 2019 S.C.C. 65, paras. 115-24 (Can.).
275. Regarding the United States, see King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 484-87
(2015).
276. Regarding the United States, see Sunstein, supra note 60, at 1675-77.
277. On the "Avoidance Canon" in the United States in this context, see Gluck
Posner, supra note 3, at 1331-32 ("Thirteen judges ...
singled out lenity and/or
constitutional avoidance as 'actual rules' and distinguished them from the other canons,
in terms of their mandatory application. They told us that these presumptions are 'not
canons' but rather are 'substantive law."'); see also Sunstein, supra note 60, at 1675.
From a general perspective, see Allan, supra note 101, at 55 ("When a statute confers
discretion on a public agency . . . the limits of that discretion should be construed
consistently with legal principles and individual rights, allowing only such minimal
encroachment on these principles and rights as is demonstrably necessary to the
fulfilment of a ' legitimate public purpose."). On the constitutionally compliant
interpretation of statutes ("verfassungskonforme Auslegung') in Austria, Germany, and
Switzerland, which is widely considered as a constitutional constraint, see, for example,
WANK, supra note 30, at 59-64; KRAMER, supra note 263, at 116-19; BYDLINSI
BYDLINSKI, supranote 263, at 55, 58.
278. Regarding Germany, see, for example, Hoffmann-Riem, supranote 4, at 746.
Regarding the United States, see, for example, TUSHNET, supra note 122, at 160.
279. Regarding Germany, see Schmidt-ABmann, supra note 60, ¶ 187; see also
VoBkuhle, supra note 65, at 118. Regarding the United States, see SUNSTEIN
VERMEULE, supra note 260, at 138 ("[I]t is for judges, not agencies, to decide whether
statutes delegate law-interpreting power to administrators, whether statutes contain
ambiguities, and whether agencies' resolutions of those ambiguities are reasonable.").
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automatically sufficient. The expertise in question must be relevant to
the disputed interpretation of the statute, especially when a prediction,
280
and the legislature
an appraisal, or an assessment must be made,

was or should have been aware of both the asymmetry and the
necessity. 28 1 For instance, the word "carcinogenic" may allow a margin
of interpretation (when and at what level can a substance or a product
be qualified as such?) and its interpretation may require non-legal
expertise as well as the making of predictions. A broad and open-ended
word used in a statute such as "reasonable" or "appropriate" can, but
should not necessarily be considered as ambiguous or unclear. In the

context of the statute in its entirety and on the basis of the applicable
methods

and

canons

of

construction,

the

distinction

between

reasonable and unreasonable may indeed be clear. In such a case,

28 2
judicial review can be exercised without any particular deference.
administrative
to
deference
judicial
Switzerland,
In
interpretation of statutes especially relates to situations where local
circumstances matter, 283 technical questions are raised, 284 or the
285
In Germany, there are three
orientation of public policies is at stake.
main forms of judicial deference to administrative decisions or other
acts, which originate from the administration's discretion (Ermessen
(planerische
planning
of
freedom
Verwaltung),
der
judgment
of
latitude
and
Gestaltungsfreiheit),
(Beurteilungsspielraum).286 These three types of deference may

28 7
The
overlap and relate to statute interpretation and application.

first two are instances where the administration has some discretion

to choose between consequences once the legal requirements of a
statute are met. They are normal features of German administrative

280. Regarding Canada, see DALY, supra note 16, at 73 ("In particular areas,
expertise may be indispensable. Risk regulation is a good example. A number of key
decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada highlight the relevance of expertise to deciding
the appropriate degree of curial deference to accord to a delegated decision-maker."
(footnote omitted)). Regarding Germany, ,see, for example, OSTER, supra note 5, at 191,
313-14; Hoffmann-Riem, supra note 4, at 744-45. Regarding the United States, see, for
example, Kavanaugh, supra note 106, at 2153 ("[C]ourts should still defer to agencies in
cases involving statutes using broad and open-ended terms like 'reasonable,'
'appropriate,' 'feasible,' or 'practicable."').
281. On this issue, see DALY, supra note 16, at 77-79. Regarding Germany, see
Eifert, supra note 9, at 339.
282. On this issue, see Kavanaugh, supra note 106, at 2153-54.
283. See Tribunal fed6ral [TF] [Federal Court] June 28, 2000, 126 ARRETS DU
TRIBUNAL FEDERAL SUISSE (RECUEIL OFFICIEL) [ATF] I 219, 222 (Switz.).
284. See Tribunal f6d6ral [TF] [Federal Court] Dec. 10, 2010, 137 ARRETS DU
TRIBUNAL FEDNRAL SUISSE (RECUEIL OFFICIEL) [ATF] II 152, 162 (Switz.).
285. See e.g., Tribunal f6d6ral [TF] [Federal Court] Aug. 31, 2006, 132 ARRTS DU
TRIBUNAL FEDERAL SUISSE (RECUEIL OFFICIEL) [ATF] II 408, 416-27 (Switz.).
286. See, e.g., OSTER, supra note 5, at 29-68; BOSCH, supra note 62, at 5-114.
287. See, e.g., OSTER, supranote 5, at 67. Regarding Switzerland, see, by analogy,
TANQUEREL, supra note 6, at 220-23.
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law. The last one especially concerns indefinite legal terms used in
statutes that the legislature has-explicitly or implicitly 2 88 -duly
authorized

the

administration

to

interpret

with

some

latitude

(Spielraum).28 9 Reviewing case law and legal literature on this issue,
one can note that cases in which judicial deference to administrative
statutory interpretation or application is admitted relate mostly to
legal norms requiring specific non-legal expertise or the making of
predictions, appraisals or assessments; more concretely, the
established cases concern professional assessments of public servants,
exam situations, complex prognoses, decisions by independent expert
panels, and by pluralistically composed panels, such as film
classification boards. 29 0 The topic is not as controversial in Germany
as in the United States, notably because the instances where deference
occurs are rather minor. Moreover, most of the cases arise between
courts and the hierarchical administration. In other words, judicial
deference to administrative statutory interpretation and independent
agencies are not connected issues in Germany.
Under the conditions mentioned in this subpart, 291 judicial

deference to administrative statutory interpretation can be seen as
acceptable, and even legitimate, in countries where there is room for
such deference. Thus, while there may be other specific situations, in
some of these countries where such deference could be justified, one
may conclude that there is a case for judicial deference, at least when
these various conditions are cumulatively met.

288.

See Aschke, supranote 30, ¶¶ 105-06; Schonenbroicher, supranote 242, ¶ 99;

Heinrich Amadeus Wolff,

§

114, in VERWALTUNGSGERICHTSORDNUNG [ADMINISTRATIVE

JUDIcIAL CODE] ¶¶ 295-96 (Helge Sodan & Jan Ziekow eds., 5th ed. 2018).
289. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFG][Federal Constitutional Court] May
31, 2011, 129 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 1, 21-

23 (Ger.).
290. See, e.g., Aschke, supra note 30, ¶¶ 107-26.4; BOSCH, supra note 62, at 4850, 63-107, 119-22, 381-88; Hoffmann-Riem, supra note 4, at 744-45; SchmidtABmann, supranote 60, ¶¶ 188-217a; Eifert, supranote 9, at 339-41. Regarding exams,
see Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG][Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 17, 1991, 84
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESvERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 34, 52-58 (Ger.).
291. For criteria that are partly close to this approach, see, regarding the United
States, Eskridge & Baer, supra note 78, at 1180 (proposing to consider whether the
agency interpretation is "consistent with larger public norms, including constitutional
values"; whether it is made "pursuant to a congressional delegation of lawmaking
authority"; and whether the agency is "applying special expertise to a technical issue,
seriously applying its understanding of the facts to carry out congressional purposes").
The authors conclude that "[w]here an agency has applied its expertise to an issue as to
which judges are substantively much less competent, judges should and do take a
deferential attitude, subject to rule-of-law limits such as textual plain meanings,
legislative compromises, and precedent." Id., at 1202. From a comparative perspective,
see Craig, supranote 14, at 402-03.
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Specific Comments Regarding Canada and the United States
This comparative study suggests that the supreme courts of

Canada and the United States have gone quite far in terms of judicial
29 2
The study, to
deference to administrative interpretation of statutes.
a certain extent, supports the doctrines developed in these two
countries but also invites reflection regarding their scope.

29 3
Firstly, a presumption of deference somehow exists in Canada,

even though its scope is significantly reduced, and the case law is not
always straightforward. In the United States, the Chevron doctrine,
even with its subsequent limitations, is rather far reaching as it makes
a link between statutory ambiguity and "delegation" of some
29 4
To be fair, the US doctrine of
interpretive authority to agencies.
judicial review is quite strict. Moreover, the reviewing court has to
defer to the agency's interpretation only if the statutory law is

interpreted as delegating interpretive authority to the agency and if
the interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision is within the
zone of reasonableness. Courts are then being asked not to invade that
zone. From a principled perspective, at least, no other country seems
to have ventured so far down the deference path on questions of legal
interpretation. Strong legal and contextual reasons may explain and
justify some landmark cases in both countries. Nevertheless, does a

presumption of deference adequately reflect the role of the courts in an
Jtat de droit when it applies to questions of law? Do courts infer too
much, institutionally speaking, from the ambiguity of statutes? In
short, should a more nuanced approach, for instance along the lines of
this Article, 295 be preferred? Such an approach might actually better

protect the Parliament of Canada or the Congress of the United
States. 296
Secondly, procedural safeguards are deemed, in several countries,
to require full judicial review of the interpretation of the law and its

application to the facts. 297 In other countries, they do not exclude any
judicial deference to administrative interpretation of statutes. Do the

doctrines developed in Canada and the United States give sufficient

292. Regarding Canada, see DEAN R. KNIGHT, VIGILANCE AND RESTRAINT IN THE
COMMON LAW OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 155 (2018) ("Notably, unlike other Anglo-

Commonwealth jurisdictions, ... deference also applies explicitly to questions of lawthat is, resolving matters of interpretation is not regarded as being the sole
constitutional preserve of the courts."). Regarding Canada and the United States, see
Boughey, supra note 43, at 37 n.16.
293. See supra Parts III.C, VI.B.
294. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984).
295. See the test proposed infra Part VII.
296. See supra Part IV.A.4.
297. See supra Parts V.D, VI.A.
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29 8

This question is

weight to judicial independence and fairness?

delicate and cannot probably be answered in abstracto. Arguably, it
should instead be examined on a case-by-case basis or, at least, on a
procedure-by-procedure basis. The case law of the European Court of
Human Rights is, mutatis mutandis, interesting in this respect. 299 The
test proposed in the conclusion of this Article allows for such an
approach.

Thirdly, are all "ambiguous" or "unclear" statutory norms equal
under the various doctrines of deference? This question is perhaps
provocative, but it aims to invite, here again, a nuanced approach. It is
argued, in this Article, that judicial deference should especially relate
to those among said norms requiring non-legal expertise for their
interpretation, soo especially when the making of a prediction,
appraisal, or assessment lies at their core. 30 1 This approach closely
follows the reasoning in the Chevron and Mead decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States30 2 and the Vavilov decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada,303 though it would reduce the breadth of
judicial deference to administrative interpretation of statutes. In the
test proposed in the conclusion of this Article, the asymmetry of nonlegal expertise is not the starting point of the analysis, but rather a
subsequent element for the courts to consider on a nuanced basis.

VII. CONCLUSION
Judicial deference

to administrative

statutory interpretation

arises in some democracies. Some courts have developed a doctrine in
this respect; others have explicitly rejected any idea of deference with
regard to the interpretation of the law. It is possible that the first defer

298. For a positive answer, see Daly, supra note 264, at 145-47. For a rather
negative answer, see Hamburger, supra note 57, at 1251 ("In the end, it must be hoped
that the judges themselves will solve the dangers of deference. Although they
undoubtedly will continue to enjoy the robes of their office, they need to decide whether
they will fill those robes. Under the Constitution, they must exercise an office of
independent judgment and must avoid systematic bias in violation of due process, and if
they fail to meet these most basic requirements, they will have little right to public
respect or even self-respect.").
299. See supraPart V.D.
300. Regarding the United States, see SUNSTEIN & VERMEULE, supra note 260, at
137-38 (referring, by analogy, to the Kisor decision, according to which "the agency's
interpretation must in some way implicate its substantive expertise." 139 S. Ct. 2400,
2417 (2019)).
301. See supra Part VI.C.2.
302. "Steps zero, one and two" of the Chevron/Mead doctrine can be linked to
conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) of the test proposed infra Part VII ("step zero" results in
particular from condition (iii)).
303. The standard of review imposed on a court and the limits imposed by the rule
of law especially result from condition (iii) of the test proposed infra Part VII.
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less than they are supposed to, according to their own doctrine, and
that the second actually defer consciously or unconsciously. One of the
great merits of a doctrine, such as the ones existing in Canada,

Germany, and the United States, is to raise an issue and to open or
frame a debate.
Judicial deference to administrative statutory interpretation may
be regarded as a pragmatic and realistic way of allocating limited
resources and of dealing with the asymmetry of non-legal expertise
among administrative bodies and courts, provided that it is framed by

several conditions. When these conditions are met, the separation of
powers principle is not endangered, and judicial deference in statutory
interpretation cases may be described as oil in the complex machinery
of checks and balances. 30 4 In any event, the legislature retains the final
say,3 0s5 at least ex post and pro futuro.
The legislature may explicitly or actively require or allow judicial
deference to administrative statutory interpretation. Courts still have

to verify that the legislature has not violated the constitution or
international law in countries where the supremacy of the one or the
other over statutes is legally enforceable. They have to interpret this
authorization in order to determine its scope as well as the intensity of
judicial review that may or must be performed.

As statutes rarely deal with the issue of judicial deference to their
interpretation, courts themselves must determine whether such
deference is permitted or forbidden, generally or in certain cases only.
The constitutional, legal, and judicial context prevailing in each
country is of great significance in this regard. It may nevertheless
provide courts with little, if any, guidance on the specific issue of
deference to administrative statutory interpretation and leave them
helpless. In this respect, courts may eventually consider adopting a
nuanced approach and applying all or part of the following test: When

(i) in light of the applicable methods and canons of construction, a
statute allows a margin of interpretation, (ii) the administrative
interpretation of the statute remains within this margin, and (iii) the
applicable international, constitutional, statutory, or other constraints
permit or, at least, do not exclude judicial deference either generally or
in the case at hand, then courts may or, depending on the country,
must defer to the administrative interpretation of the statute,
especially when or, depending on the country, provided that (iv) this
interpretation requires non-legal expertise, (v) the administrative

304. From a broader-i.e., not focused on statutory interpretation-and
comparative perspective, see Zhu, supra note 16, at 15 ("[Judicial deference to the
administration] is an integral part of the constitutional system, which brings flexibility
in the arteriosclerotic separation of powers system, balances the lack of political
legitimacy of the courts as well as the lack of expertise when it is at stake.").
305. Regarding the United States, see, for example, Sunstein, supra note 60, at
1634-41; see also Reitz, supra note 4, at 287.
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body enjoys an asymmetry of such expertise as compared to courts, and
(vi) the legislature was or should have been aware of both this
necessity and this asymmetry. Depending on how condition (iii) is

interpreted in a given country, courts could disregard condition (vi).
The level of courts' expertise in the relevant subject matter should in
principle be determined after taking account of the measures available
to judges, including the appointment of experts. The proposed test may
notably be followed when the disputed statute interpretation requires
the making of a prediction, appraisal or assessment.

